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ABSTRACT
China has experienced massive internal migration in the past three decades. The 
rapidly growing urban population, especially the rural to urban migrant population, is the 
primary social concern with respect to public health and social stability that China is 
facing in recent decades. Both the public and private sectors have hastened to respond to 
the emerging needs of this socially, economically and politically marginalized group. In 
the current dissertation, the author utilizes judicial decisions from the Intermediate Level 
Courts in the Guangdong province, China, in order to examine the characteristics of rural 
migrant offenders, and to explore the relationship between rural migration and crime. The
current study shows that rural migrants are overrepresented in the criminal defendant 
population in the Intermediate level of courts. Compared to urban offenders, rural 
migrant offenders are disproportionately represented as offenders who have committed 
typical street crimes. Rural migrant offenders are predominantly undereducated and 
underemployed at the time of offenses, and they have received relatively harsher fixed 
term sentences for the same type of offense compared to urban offenders. Theoretical 
interpretations and implications of the study’s findings are discussed.
xiv
CHAPTER I
ANOMIE, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND CRIME
There is a long tradition in the criminological literature that relates modernization 
and social transition with increases in the crime rate. In the late 1800s Emile Durkheim 
employed the concept of anomie to refer to a state of disorder brought about by rapid 
social change. His theoretical debut explained how the Industrial Revolution in France 
affected social, economic, and interpersonal relationships on various levels. Durkheim 
pointed out that during periods of rapid social transition, a state of normlessness is 
expected. The old social norms become increasingly less effective in regulating the 
desires of individuals, while new rules and norms have not yet been established. Under 
these circumstances, various deviant behaviors ensue. Although Durkheim famously 
focused on the relation between anomie and suicide, he suggested that an anomic state 
could create a tendency towards increased crime rates.
Durkheim’s work on society and the division of labor was intended as a universal 
theory, meant to explain all types of society. As such, his work on anomie can provide 
insights into the situation surrounding China’s economic reform since the 1980s. The 
economic reform in China has created profound social changes and unprecedented 
economic growth in the last three decades. Between 1990 and 1998, China’s GDP 
increased by an average of 11.9% annually. For example, China’s GDP in 1998 was 964 
billion which made China the 7th largest economy in the world (Liu & Messner, 2001). 
Since 2000, after China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
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China became the world’s largest manufacturing and exporting country. This economic 
development, however, has also changed the social fabric of Chinese society (Deng & 
Cordilia, 1999). Among many of those changes, the breakdown of traditional cultural 
values and norms brought various social problems, such as crime. This phenomenon was 
quite similar to what Durkheim called “anomie”.
As shown in China’s government reports and scholarly research, during the period
of modernization and economic development in China, there has been an increase in the 
number of crimes the country has experienced. According to Nielsen and Smyth (2008), 
crimes skyrocketed in China between the late 1980s and 1990s, and they have 
increasingly became a primary concern for public safety. Between 1988 and 1995, 
homicide rates increased by 71%. Assaults, robbery, and grand theft increased 171%, 
351%, and 237%, respectively (Guo, 1996). Madsen (2012) also found that since 1978, 
the crime rates in China have increased by 300%. In 1978, a total crime rate of 55.91 per 
100,000 people was recorded, while in 1998, the total crime rate increased to 163.19 per 
100,000 people (Liu & Messner, 2001).
Not only have crime statistics indicated a surging crime trend, Chinese citizens 
have also expressed their concerns regarding crime. For example, a 1991 national survey 
asked respondents about their concerns over public safety; two-thirds of the respondents 
rated crime and social instability as very high concerns. It is worth noting that crime rates
were increasing during the same time period that China was experiencing a massive wave
of migration. Research indicates that there is a relationship between crime and 
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urbanization, especially surrounding the continuing increase in the number of migrants 
(Dutton, 1997).
China has experienced massive internal migration in the past three decades. One 
cause of this migration was Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” movement in the 1950s–a push 
for industrializing China that resulted in an economic disparity between rural and urban 
China. Due to years of planned economic activity which prioritized industrialization and 
urban growth while ignoring the needs and interests of rural areas, the former gained 
wealth at the expense of the latter (Cai, 2007; Liang, 2001). This wealth gap initiated 
China’s “Great Migration”, referred to as the greatest population movement in Chinese 
history, and has occurred over the decades of economic development since the 1980s (Qu 
& Zhao, 2011; Frijters, 2010).
The second cause of the great migration was the “‘Reform and Open Market 
Policy” initiated at the end of the 1970s. While China had already undergone 
considerable industrialization under Mao, the open market policy amplified the rural to 
urban divide by promoting a more thoroughly market-based economy with a 
corresponding reduction in the importance of agricultural production and a greater 
emphasis on non-agricultural market sectors (Deng & Cordilia, 1999; Lewis & Xue, 
2003; Liang, 2001; Meng & Zhang, 2001; Zhu, 2007). With this shift, new businesses and
job opportunities grew rapidly in urban areas (Gu et al., 2007; Liang, 2001; Liang & Ma, 
2014).
After 1979, a household registration system, originally initiated by Mao to ensure 
rural reform, came to be called hukou. It requires the citizens of China to have their 
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households registered as either rural or urban. Over the decades since the hukou 
registration policy was initiated, the income gap between rural and urban populations 
became wider (with a much higher income in the cities), thereby accelerating the pace of 
internal migration. These changes have created in China a large “floating population”, a 
term which refers to people who move to areas where they do not possess local hukou. A 
large number of Chinese citizens with rural hukou (who have moved to cities) constitute 
the majority of this floating population. In general, rural to urban migrants are defined as 
those people between the age of 15 and 64 with rural hukou (Hu et al., 2011). The author 
will use the term “rural to urban migrants” to refer to workers both temporarily and 
permanently leaving houses and families in rural regions and migrating to cities to find 
work. However, in most of the Chinese literature, terms such as floating population, rural 
laborers/workers, and migrant workers will refer to the same migrant population.
The floating population in China represents one of the greatest internal migrations
of people in history as rural populations have moved to cities in response to growing 
labor demand. According to Gong et al. (2012), in the past three decades, China has seen 
a rise in urban population from 191 million in 1980 to 622 million in 2009. By 2013 more
than 260 million Chinese had left their hometowns for at least six months, which includes
more than 160 million migrant workers moving from rural to urban areas (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). Between 2014 and 2030, the average rise in the 
number of city-dwellers in China each year is likely to be around 13 million (The World 
Bank, 2014). By 2030 Chinese cities are expected to be home to about one billion people 
(The Economist, April 19, 2014).
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This rural to urban migration has profound import for the stability and functioning
of Chinese society. Though it is crucial to recognize the huge contributions rural migrants
have made to China’s urban growth (Knight et al., 2011), rural to urban migrants 
encounter various problems on a daily basis, such as difficulties in adapting to new urban 
life and a disparity between the expectations and realities of economic wellbeing in 
migrant destinations. Rural migrants are usually moving from locations where family 
values and community traditions were deeply embedded to modern, fast, and competitive 
urban destinations. China’s Development Research Foundation (2013) describes the 
living situation of rural migrant workers in urban areas as involving “four 
disassociations”. Migrant workers are registered in rural areas but work in the cities; 
therefore, there is an institutional disassociation between “household registration” and 
actual residence. As migrant workers come from rural origins but often work in cities, 
they are physically dissociated from their rural communities and families, specifically 
their children. Workers rarely have time to go back to visit their families; this causes 
increasing disassociation between children of the rural migrants and the migrants 
themselves. There is also disassociation from the income migrants earn in the cities in 
which they work, as it is mainly used to support families back in rural areas rather than 
for their personal expenses (The China Development Research Foundation, 2013). In 
summary, rural to urban migrants face various challenges in social, economic, physical 
and psychological arenas after their migration.
Most importantly, it must be understood how the breakdown of traditional values 
and family support systems have negatively impacted the life experiences of rural 
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migrants as well as Chinese culture more generally. Economic reform has drastically 
changed cultural and social aspects of Chinese traditions over the past two decades. 
Chinese society is ancient and has been characterized by an extensive set of informal 
social controls and a strong emphasis on internal social control as reflected in the 
personal quality of “virtue”. In addition, Chinese society has for centuries been organized
in a highly communitarian manner, and people have been oriented toward collective 
rather than individual goals (Liu & Messner, 2001). The social and economic reforms that
have taken place since 1979 have broken down these traditional values. As Liu and 
Messner discussed, before the reform era, China was identified as a society with a strong 
emphasis on traditions and collective norms. Conversely, an individualistic ethic is 
prevalent in a market-based society and self-interests are valued above the good of the 
community and society (Liu & Messner, 2001).
Other social problems have been created due to the large number of rural to urban 
migrants. These problems include institutional discrimination due to the restrictive 
household registration policies (Wong, F., Chang, K., & He, D., 2009); social 
stigmatization and discrimination in state-owned employment sectors and among urban 
residents (Gu et al., 2007; Herd, 2013; Lu & Song 2006; Meng & Zhang, 2001; Shen et 
al., 2012; Wang et al., 2010); psychological distress and feelings of alienation (Mou et al.,
2013; Wang et al., 2010); economic and educational disadvantages (Frijters et al., 2011; 
Lu & Song, 2006; Akay, Bargain, & Zimmermann. 2012); and victimization (Cheng & 
Wang, 2013; Hunter et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2007; Zhong & Broadhurst, 2007). Among 
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these various problems, one of the most prevalent is crime (Liu, Zhang, & Messner, 
2001).
In the following chapters, the author will provide the context in which the 
relationship between crime and migration in China might be better understood, as well as 
investigating this relationship in one sample province. First, a brief discussion will be 
provided of China’s criminal justice system, as well as a statistical picture of crime in 
China during the economic reform era. The next three chapters will review the literature 
on the scope of rural to urban migration in China, including the influence of 
governmental policies on rural migration; the relationship between 
urbanization/industrialization and labor demand; government control of household 
registration policy; patterns of rural migration; eras of migration; and specific problems 
and concerns, with an emphasis on crime. Chapters VI and VII will describe the methods 
and findings of the current study’s examination using the Online Judicial Database for 
Guangdong Province. Finally, a theoretical discussion of the findings regarding crime and
migration for the sample province will be provided in Chapter VIII.
7
CHAPTER II
CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN CHINA
In this chapter, the author discusses crime and the justice system in China in order
to introduce the Chinese Justice System to readers. Firstly, the author introduces the 
elements of a crime, as well as the major types of offenses that are delineated in the 
Chinese criminal law. Secondly, the author examines the Chinese Police Force, as well as 
the extant literature on the relationship between policing and rural migrants in China. 
Thirdly, the Chinese judicial system, its function, and types of sentences will be 
discussed. Fourthly, the author will discuss the influence of political culture on legal 
reforms in China. Lastly, official crime statistics for China for the economic transition era
will be introduced.
Elements of a Crime
The written criminal code for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was first 
introduced during the 1990s. According to that law, and the revisions of 2011, there are 
four elements which must be present to constitute a crime: 1) a criminal subject capable 
of bearing criminal liability (age factor and mental factor); 2) the requisite mental 
element or condition—e.g. in certain types of criminal offense, such as selling counterfeit
products, the seller shall be guilty only if he or she has knowledge that the goods were 
counterfeited; 3) an interest (e.g. sovereignty, territorial integrity, security of the state, and
rights of citizens) that is recognized and protected by the state and that interest is 
infringed; 4) substantial harm caused by the act or omission of the criminal subject to the 
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interest protected by the state. As for age liability, anyone who reaches the age of sixteen 
and commits a crime shall bear criminal responsibility. Between the ages of 14 and 16, a 
person will only bear criminal liability for serious crimes such as murder, rape and 
robbery; otherwise he/she will be diverted to the juvenile justice system much like in the 
United States (US). Anyone who commits a crime between the ages of 14 and 18 shall be 
given a lighter or mitigated punishment, according to People’s Republic of China 
Criminal Law. All these elements should be established during the judicial proceeding, 
and these elements might directly influence the liability, charges, and conviction of the 
criminal defendants.
Type of Offense
According to Chow (2003/2015), the purpose of the criminal law in China is to 
target crimes against the national interest. For instance, in the 1979 Law, a number of 
provisions defined the scope of crimes under the category of “counterrevolution”, a legal 
definition which is not entirely clear. The 1997 Criminal Law identified the following 
categories of crimes: endangering public safety; undermining the socialist market 
economic order; infringing upon the rights of the person and democratic rights of 
citizens; encroaching on property rights; disrupting the order of social administration; 
endangering national defense; grant and bribery; dereliction of duty and violation of 
duties by military servicemen. Other specific types of crimes under the Criminal Law 
include crimes against the person and crimes against property. The former crimes 
include homicide, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny theft, human trafficking, and abduction. The latter crimes include but are not 
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limited to simple assault, theft, counterfeiting/forgery, embezzlement, possession of 
stolen property, possession of firearms, drugs, and other illegal properties. These types of 
crimes are comparable to the Type I and Type II offenses defined under the Uniform 
Crime Report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States of America. 
Among crimes that are unique to China is criminal defamation (Article 246)–which 
prohibits publicly insulting a person or fabricating facts to defame others. Most recently, 
in the 2011 Criminal law, a few provisions regarding intellectual property and cyber-
crime have been addressed.
Policing in China
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, policing 
primarily served a political function, acting as an important instrument of the state, 
serving goals such as suppressing counter-revolution (Dai, 2001). However, during the 
economic reform era a number of changes have resulted in the Chinese government’s 
adopting a new interpretation of state power and altering how the police are used. First, 
the economic and social changes in Chinese society have resulted in vast social problems,
such as economic inequality. This unwanted social outcome has received blame as the 
major cause of China’s increasing crime rate. Second, the Maoist ideology has gradually 
lost its popularity. Consequently, the primary function of policing in China has moved 
from counter-revolution to the maintenance of public security through a more 
westernized patrol and investigative style.
The organizational structure of the Chinese police is hierarchical. The 
organizational structure runs from the Ministry of Public Security at the national level, to 
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provincial departments of public security, and finally to city and local public security 
bureaus. The primary function of the Ministry of Public Security is to investigate criminal
cases that are highly complex, involving multiple provinces, as well as foreign affairs. 
The civil responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security, on the other hand, includes 
administrative power regarding entry into China’s territory and record maintenance with 
respect to citizenship. At the provincial and larger city levels, there are stations 
corresponding to a wide range of internal organizational functions (Ward, 1985). 
According to Jiao (2001), within a typical medium to large urban city, a police 
department commonly has the following bureaus. “ ” 民警 (Min Jing) is the civil branch 
within a police department. Its responsibilities primarily include registering and updating 
“hukou” registration; issuing temporary residential permits to migrants (rural and non-
rural migrants); responding to citizen’s civil disputes; engaging in community crime 
prevention and safety education; outreach to community members, and ensuring the 
orderliness of the community within a police jurisdiction. “ ” 巡警 (Xun Jing) is a concept 
very close to the American police system’s concept of patrol officer. These officers are 
normally assigned to patrol cars and to enforce public safety. “ ” 刑侦大队 (Xing Zhen 
Dda Ddue) is similar to a “crime investigation unit”. Most of people within this group are
senior level police officers with years of law enforcement experiences or specialties in 
forensic sciences, interrogation, and interviews. “ ” 交警 (Jiao Jing) are police officers 
who are only in charge of traffic violations and citations. These officers are trained for 
enforcing traffic laws and are not equipped with arms.
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At the village and township level, neighborhood police stations serve each 
community (typically a specific geographic location with approximately 600 to 800 
households) with various civil and educational functions. Policing at the community level
is responsible for maintaining records of births and deaths, local residential records, as 
well as community-level crime prevention efforts and community relation building. 
Compared to police stations in a larger city, these neighborhood police are more 
commonly involved with civil disputes and administrative work. Police work in China 
involves social, economic, cultural, educational, and political aspects. Chinese police not 
only function as an administrative branch to maintain and update civil records but also 
fulfill obligations including investigation, interrogation, and supervision of defendants.
The literature dealing with the policing of migrant populations suggests that the 
control of rural migrant population is the primary concern of local governments (Zhao, 
2003). Those migrants who are identified as “three withouts” (without legal documents, 
legal work, and legal source of income) are subject to detention and deportation back to 
the countryside. According to Han (2008), policing practices in contemporary China 
reinforce a race-like status for Chinese rural migrants. As the sole governmental 
organization that operates the “hukou” registration system, the Chinese police use 
“administrative detention” as a primary mechanism for controlling migrant populations. 
With almost unlimited discretionary power, the police use of excessive force against rural
migrants is not uncommon (Han, 2008). Consistent with the literature, several high 
profile cases of abuse have been documented by the Chinese news media. Among those 
high profile cases, one incident was reported in Guangzhou, where the current study takes
12
place. Sun ZhiGang, a 27 year old rural migrant who had just landed a job in Guangzhou,
was arrested by the local police due to his failure to show his “temporary resident permit”
during a street stop. Sun died in a detention center two days later , and, according to the 
autopsy report, his death was caused by severe physical abuse by the police. The 
“racialization” and “discrimination” practices towards rural migrants by the Chinese 
police forces is well documented by both the scholarly literature (Han, 2008; Zhao, 2003)
and the news media.
Brief Description of China’s Judicial System
The structure of the court system in the PRC. According to Chow (2015), the 
court system in the PRC is composed of four levels of courts. The highest court is the 
Supreme Court of PRC with a maximum of two trials to complete a case. At the 
provincial level, the structure of China’s court system is divided into three major 
branches: the Supreme Court of each province, all levels of People’s Courts in each 
province, and Special Courts. Within all levels of People’s Courts, there are three 
hierarchically categorized court systems: High (Superior) People’s Court, Intermediate 
People’s Court, and Basic (Inferior) People’s Court. As Chow states, in order to give the 
public easy access to the court system and legal resources, the basic courts have 
established over 30,000 subordinate divisions known as people’s tribunals in townships 
and villages (an administrative division below the county level). Above the county level, 
there are approximately 390 Intermediate People’s Courts in cities and prefecture level 
cities within provinces, and 34 High (Superior) level people’s courts at the provincial 
level (including autonomous regions and four municipalities).
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According to Chow (2015), the jurisdictional distinctions between courts are not 
so clearly demarcated because upper level courts can exercise jurisdiction over any given 
case. In other words, with the exception of all Basic People’s Courts, both Intermediate 
People’s Courts and High People’s Court have the original jurisdiction of the first 
instance, depending on the severity and complexity of the case. According to Article 20 
of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), the Basic Court can request jurisdiction change to 
an upper level court if the case is complicated and sensitive.
Intermediate People’s Courts have original jurisdiction over cases as provided by 
law, as well as first instance transferals from the Basic People’s Courts, and cases of 
appeal and prosecution initiated by the People’s Procuretorate1 Department. Intermediate 
Court can also request a jurisdictional transfer to the higher level people’s court. In 
addition, Article 18 of the Law of Civil Procedure (1991, revised 2012) further provides 
that Intermediate Courts have jurisdiction over cases involving a foreign element, cases 
with significant impact upon the administrative region (e.g. money laundering in specific 
1 The concept of procuratorate is similar to federal prosecutor of the USA. Under the PRC Constitution,
the procuratorate along with the courts and public security departments, comprise three major judicial
branches that administer criminal cases. The procuratorate performs duties based on the Soviet model
and  involves  overseeing  and  approving  arrests  by  the  public  security  departments  as  well  as
prosecuting  criminal  cases.  Under  the  Constitution,  the  procuratorate  and  the  courts  are  of  an
equivalent rank and report, along with the public security departments, to the people’s congresses at
various levels. Among its responsibilities, the procuratorate is to supervise the work of the courts and
the public security departments to ensure they are free of misconduct. In supervising the work of the
courts in  criminal  cases,  the procuratorate exercises  this  power by appealing against  cases  of  first
instance  and  through  the  procedure  of  adjudication  supervision.  Under  the  PRC Constitution,  the
procuratorate along with the courts and public  security departments,  comprise three major  judicial
branches that administer criminal cases. The procuratorate performs duties based on the Soviet model
and  involves  overseeing  and  approving  arrests  by  the  public  security  departments  as  well  as
prosecuting  criminal  cases.  Under  the  Constitution,  the  procuratorate  and  the  courts  are  of  an
equivalent rank and report, along with the public security departments, to the people’s congresses at
various levels. Among its responsibilities, the procuratorate is to supervise the work of the courts and
the public security departments to ensure they are free of misconduct. In supervising the work of the
courts in  criminal  cases,  the procuratorate exercises  this  power by appealing against  cases  of  first
instance and through the procedure of adjudication supervision.
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prefectural level cities), and cases determined to be under their jurisdiction–which 
includes: 1) cases confirming patent rights and cases handled by customs; 2) suits against 
specific administrative acts taken by departments under the State Council or by the 
people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities; 3) grave and 
complicated cases. In addition, according to Article 20 of the CPL (1996, revised 2012), 
Intermediate Courts shall be the court of first instance in cases endangering state security 
or involving terrorist activities and cases punishable by death or life sentence which are 
equivalent to Class A felonies in the United States. In short, Intermediate People’s Courts 
are most comparable to the courts of original jurisdiction that hear felony cases in the 
United States of America.
According to Article 27 of CPL, the High People’s Courts have jurisdiction over 
cases of first instance by law, as well as the cases of first instance transferred from lower 
level courts. In addition, High People’s Courts have jurisdiction over the appeals and 
protections against judgments and orders of lower courts and lawsuits initiated by the 
people’s Procuretorates. Article 21 of Criminal Procedure Law states that the High 
People’s Court has jurisdiction of first instance over major criminal cases that pertain to 
an entire province, such as corruption and racketeering of the governors.
The Supreme People’s Court has jurisdiction over, according to Article 31 of CPL,
appeals and protests against judgments, orders of High People’s courts, and Specialty 
Courts and lawsuits that are initiated by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (the highest 
authorities of the People’s Procuratorate) . The Supreme Court also has original 
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jurisdiction over cases related to administrative, civil and criminal cases that affect the 
whole country.
In conclusion, the structure of China’s judicial system is divided into High, 
Intermediate, and Basic People’s Courts. In terms of jurisdictions of each level of court, 
other than functioning as appellate courts, Intermediate and High People’s courts both 
have first jurisdiction over certain cases given the degree of crime severity. As will be 
discussed in Chapter VI, cases from the Intermediate People’s Court are used in the 
current research in order to make sure a wide range of relatively serious criminal cases 
are included.
The judicial proceeding for the first instance. In general, both criminal and 
civil cases in China are decided by a collegiate bench consisting of an odd number of 
judges. The exception here are cases of simple civil offenses (e.g. neighbor disputes) and 
minor criminal offenses (e.g. traffic law violation), which can be heard through a 
summary procedure before a single judge. In lower courts, a collegiate panel generally 
consists of three judges with the size increasing with the level of courts. In criminal cases,
an investigation by the public security departments, the Procuretorate, and judicial 
personnel precedes the initial trial. The trial involves interrogation of the defendants, 
questionings of the witnesses, evidence presentation, and court debate led by the 
Procuretorate and public/private defender. In criminal cases, courts must announce their 
judgments within two to three months. All of this information should be stated in each 
judicial decision document.
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Procedure and challenges of judicial appeal. After a case has gone through the 
first trial, the defendant and the Procuratorate have ten days to appeal a judgment and five
days to appeal an order from the time it is affected. In criminal cases, the Procuratorate 
and the prosecuting department have the right of protest by way of appealing against the 
judgment of the court. Appeals and protests in criminal cases must be decided within a 
maximum of one and a half months. Based on Chapter III: Procedure of Appeal of the 
CPL, offenders, victims, offender’s and victim’s immediate family members, defense 
attorney, and private/public Procurators can file a motion to appeal.2 After receiving cases
from a lower level court, appellate courts should organize a private committee to review 
the case. After all case files are submitted to the appellate court, the court committee will 
review all materials relevant to the criminal procedure and criminal charges and make 
decisions according to the following: If the evidence is sufficient and the criminal 
procedure was legal in the original judicial decision, the sentence should be maintained; 
if mistakes were made in the original judicial decisions related to misinterpretation of 
legal provisions, the appellate court should correct the original judicial decision and apply
the correct legal reference; if the original judicial decision lacks supporting facts, 
evidence or includes wrongful witnesses evidence, the original jurisdiction will be 
required to re-collect evidence and retry the case; if the original judicial decision violates 
the criminal procedures, the case should be retried by the original jurisdiction. After the 
appellate procedure, if any of the parties in the case require a second appeal, the appellate
court should take over the responsibilities of the original jurisdiction, and the case cannot 
2 There are some legal exceptions that will be discussed in “Challenges of Appeal” later.
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be returned. In these cases, the judicial decisions directly made by appellate court are the 
final decisions. 
A few issues regarding appellate procedures should be addressed. Firstly, the 
principle of judicial appeal in China is “Appeal without increasing punishment” as 
described in the CPL. However, according to Article 190 of the CPL, if the appellant 
party is the People’s Procuratorate, the original sentence could be changed regardless of 
whether it is heavier or lighter. In addition, according to Article 189, CPL, if the facts of 
the first trial were not clear and evidence was not sufficient, the case should be returned 
to the court of original jurisdiction. In certain circumstances, this return for retrial could 
result in a sentence for criminal defendants that is much more severe than the first 
instance. Secondly, under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, a court of second instance is
not required to hold an open hearing except in certain circumstances3, which results in 
many cases being decided on the basis of written documents without a hearing. Without a
hearing, parties involved in the case are not able to participate in the appellate 
proceedings, according to Chou (2015), which might jeopardize the procedural justice of 
the appeal. Thirdly, not every case will be granted an appeal. For example, Hu et al. 
(2015) found that the upper level court will accept an appeal if it involves factual 
problems or possible misinterpretation of the law in the first trial in only 70% of cases. 
Parties who request the appellate hearing have the burden of proof regarding the claimed 
3 Under the 2012 revision of CPL, the court of second instance must form a collegial panel and try a case
openly when:  1)  the  appeal  parties  have  objections to  evidence presented in  the first  trial;  2)  the
defendants have been sentenced to prison for life or received the death penalty; 3) the Procuratorate
filed a motion against the original decision. If the court decides to hold a hearing, the appellate court
will review both the factual and procedural document of the case regardless of what was appealed. All
death penalty cases must be granted and reviewed by the Supreme Court of China (CPL, 2012).
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factual or legal misinterpretations. If the appellant cannot provide sufficient evidence to 
convince the appellate court, the appeal will not be granted.
Sentence. According to Chow (2015), sentences are divided into principal and 
supplementary sections. Under Article 33 of the Criminal Law, the principal punishments 
are public surveillance (probation/parole), pre-conviction detention, fixed term 
imprisonment, life imprisonment, and the death penalty. In addition to principal 
punishments, supplemental punishments, including fines, deprivation of political rights, 
and confiscation of property, may be ordered. Furthermore, any person convicted of a 
crime may be required to compensate the victim(s) for economic losses caused by the 
crime. All these types of punishments could appear in our current sample.
Another important reflection on the severity of punishment in China is the use of 
capital punishment in the PRC. According to Miao (2013), China has topped the list of 
pro-death penalty states with the highest reported execution rate (Amnesty International, 
2012). According to Miao (2013) and Tifft (1985), China’s capital punishment serves a 
primary function to maintain the political legitimacy of the Communist Party with 
changing political needs.
Crime and Punishment in China During the Transition Era
As a post-communist society, political ideologies play the most significant role in 
shaping China’s legal policies. Mao emphasized the importance of class struggle and 
freedom of the proletariat, while Deng focused on economic development and the 
codification of legal regulation (Trevaskes, 2010). During the 1990s, China’s regime 
under Jiang primarily focused on the “Rule of Law” with an emphasis on the enforcement
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of the law in a strict and swift manner. As noted earlier, it was at this time that the PRC 
first introduced a written criminal code. Xi’s regime, which is also called the 
“harmonious society era”, continually emphasizes the importance of the severity of the 
punishment. In conclusion, the Chinese law-making process has been largely influenced 
by state interests, most notably political stability and state economic growth.
In addition to political ideology, the kind of social norms that are valued by 
Chinese society are an additional driving force in shaping China’s legal policies. As 
Durkheim indicated, social norms (i.e. the collective conscience) are not constant but 
vary greatly in different segments of society, within different subcultures, and throughout 
different periods of history. When it comes to the normative standards of Chinese society,
the literature indicates a mixed record regarding the degree to which traditional values 
might have changed over decades of economic development. Due to the sparse literature 
on the perceptions of rural migrants toward traditional values, the author primarily uses 
studies that focus on urban (native) residents. Herdin and Aschauer (2013) stated in their 
original study that “breaks in society” can occur “...where modernization interferes with 
traditions…” (p.4). Nonetheless, Herdin and Aschauer argued that, although urbanization 
and globalization are deeply influential on how people in China think and interact with 
each other, traditional values are still deeply rooted in Chinese culture. Other research, 
however, indicated that social and economic changes are like a catalyst that has altered 
the traditional values and social norms of Chinese society. Zeng and Greenfield (2015) 
discussed the ways in which the collectivism that is deeply embedded in thousands of 
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years of Chinese tradition is incompatible with the emerging market value that “getting 
rich is glorious”.
It is apparent that the literature is not unanimous with respect to whether China 
today is more collectivist or individualistic in orientation. However, what the literature 
can confirm is that crime is an unwanted consequence (Roucek, 1947). In response to 
increases in crime and social disorder, China has become ever more dependent on formal 
social control mechanisms, as can be seen most clearly with the creation of a criminal 
code and the changing role of the police. According to Durkheim, as societies become 
complex and industrialized, they change from a predominantly integrated community 
with low division of labor, to highly fragmented, divided, and individually centered 
societies. Primary social control mechanisms, such as family, are no longer able to exert 
control on personal behaviors. This results in a normative shift from informal social 
control to formal social control. In conclusion, in industrialized China, with increased 
inequality, population density, individualization and cultural complexity, there is a greater
need for formal social control (Jiang et al., 2007).
Beyond the political ideologies and social norms, public opinions towards crime 
and punishment also shape China’s penal philosophy. One of the most studied facets of 
crime and punishment in China is fear of crime among the Chinese public, as well as their
perceptions of capital punishment. According to a study in 2009, a national survey 
conducted in 2007 regarding “quality of life” indicated that crime and victimization were 
a significant public concern. This “crime consciousness" brought about increased demand
for the Chinese government to be “tough on crime” (Zhang et al., 2009). On the other 
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hand, another study in 2009 explored attitudes among Chinese citizens regarding support 
for the death penalty (Jiang et al., 2009). As Jiang mentioned, traditional beliefs within 
China’s penal history are quite deterrence-oriented, which is vividly reflected in popular 
sayings such as, “executing one deters a hundred” and “killing a chicken to scare a 
monkey” (Jiang et al. p.2). This traditional belief has a great influence on why people 
support the death penalty in China, with a general “willingness to sacrifice a few for the 
whole community” (p.6). Lu and Zhang (2005) also explained that the proliferation of 
capital punishment reflected how the Chinese government was dealing with surging 
crime rates during the economic reform era.
In conclusion, political ideologies, social norms, and public opinions all have had 
great influences on legal reform and punishment in China. It is possible that legal reforms
and political agendas created a reinforcing effect, wherein more proactive law 
enforcement and increased legal sanction imposition ultimately resulted in much higher 
levels of imprisonment. Rural migrants, specifically, are likely to be the target of these 
political agendas. They are informally called the “floating population” and commonly 
associated with stereotypes of ignorance, and viewed as outsiders. Because of these 
negative perceptions of rural migrants, one should expect to see greater concern from 
urban areas where most rural migrants reside.
Official Crime Statistics in China during the Social Transitional Era
In the literature on Chinese crime and criminal justice, there have always been 
challenges in collecting and analyzing quantitative data (Liu & Messner, 2001). 
Traditionally, criminological research and the attendant collection of data has been a 
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highly sensitive issue in China. One reason is that it was the Chinese government’s 
position that crime should not be a part of a socialist society. In addition, government 
officials have tended to fear that the publication of crime data would damage the 
country’s image (Liang & Lu, 2006).
Examples of crime data resources are the 1987 Chinese Law Yearbook, along with
the more recent annual report published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
entitled “China Statistical Yearbook”. This report contains a comprehensive statistical 
overview of various aspects of China’s social and economic development. Although not 
consistently appearing by year, crime statistics can be found in the Yearbook in a sub-
section titled “Criminal Cases Registered in Public Security Organs and Their 
Composition”. Within this volume, serious offenses, including homicide, injury (e.g. 
aggravated assault), robbery, rape, abduction, larceny, fraud, smuggling, and 
counterfeiting are recorded. This document is similar to the United States’ Uniform 
Crime Report. More recently, in order to promote the rule of law, there has been a push 
for local agencies to make crime data more available to the public. However, the quality 
assurance of these datasets have not been as expected.
When looking at overall crime rates, China traditionally has been a country with 
very low crime rates (Guo, 1996). For example, in 1960, the total crime rate was 34 per 
100,000 people. In 1970, the total crime rate was 46 per 100,000 people. However, during
the economic reform of the 1980s and 1990s, there was a dramatic increase in crime. For 
example, in 1980, the total crime rate was 77 per 100,000 population, and in 1999, the 
total crime rate in China increased to 200 per 100,000 people. Interestingly, while assault 
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and property crime rates have increased during the 1980s and beyond, the same is not 
true for homicide. For example, According to Guo (1996), between 1988 and 1995, the 
total homicide crime rate increased 71%; assault increased 171%, robbery increased 
353%; grand theft increased 237%; fraud increased by 239%, and counterfeiting 
increased 947%. But, in 1995 the number of homicides began to decline: there were 
27,256 total registered homicide offenses in 1995; by 2012, the total number of homicide 
registered at the Public Safety Organ in China was 11,286–a nearly 59% decrease. The 
total number of assaults, however, increased from 72,259 in 1995 to 163,620, which 
represents a 126% increase. Serious property crimes, such as larceny theft, increased 
drastically. In 1995, the total number of registered larceny crimes was 1,132,789, while in
2012, the total had increased to 4,284,670; a 278% increase. This trend seems to be 
continuing as seen in the most recent report. According to the China Year Book 2016, in 
2015, the total number of homicides registered at the Public Safety Organ was 9,200 
while larceny theft was 4,875,561.
The migrant population, especially rural migrants, became immediately associated
with the overall increase in crime in China, and this population has received the focus of 
government officials. Official data shows that migrants are responsible for a large 
proportion of offenses (Ma, 2001). In some cities, more than half of the criminal cases are
committed by rural migrants (Xiang, 1998). Crimes among migrants in Beijing, 
according to the official report, have increased dramatically. In 1986, 22.5% of all the 
criminal defendants in that city were migrants. This percentage has been escalating since. 
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In 1990, 30.6% of all crimes were committed by migrants; by 1994, this percentage had 
increased to 50% (Ma, 2001).
Ma’s study also shows that the severity of official punishment has increased along
with the seriousness of offenses committed by migrants. Among migrant offenders, 
42.4% were sentenced to life imprisonment in 1990, 41.4% in 1991, 44.6% in 1992, and 
63.7% in 1994. In addition, both violent and nonviolent crimes committed by migrants 
were primarily oriented toward financial gain. Gang crimes also increased among the 




AN OVERVIEW OF RURAL TO URBAN MIGRATION
Political Influences: Rural to Urban Migration Under Mao and Deng
Both Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” and Deng Xiaoping’s series of regional 
economic development plans had a significant impact on rural to urban migration. 
According to Han (2009) and Joseph (1986), the “Great Leap Forward” movement and 
the Chinese Five Year Plan were implemented as a socialist transformation of both the 
agricultural and industrial systems. During the Five Year Plan of the mid to late 1950s, 
“backyard” factories with small-scale steel furnaces were created all over the country in 
order to increase industrial production. With regard to agricultural production, farmers 
were encouraged to increase their crop yields through “the power of [their] subjective 
will and efforts” under Mao’s leadership (Joseph, 1986, p.22). The movement prioritized 
the development of heavy industry (e.g. steel and coal) while ignoring the importance of 
technology and service industries, along with science and education more generally. In 
the agricultural arena, greater attention was paid to ideology than to successful farming 
practices. Later, during the Cultural Revolution era from 1966-1976, the Communist 
Party prioritized the importance of class struggle. Thousands of intellectuals were forced 
to migrate to rural areas to achieve self-reformation through “reform by labor” in an 
effort to rectify the “rightist deviation” (Baum, 1964). Among the many consequences of 
the movement, economic imbalance, grain shortage, and the discontinuation of social 
development had an alarming effect on economic reform and internal migration in China.
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Perhaps more important than the policies of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms was the abolishment of the communes that used to dominate rural life since the 
1950s and their replacement with the "household contract responsibility" system—
whereby farming was done at the household rather than the collective level. According to 
Kasarda, J., and Janowitz, M. (1974), Mackenzie (2002), and Yang and Goldstein (1999), 
agricultural reforms motivated farmers to profit from production efficiency. The central 
government initiated price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled farmers 
to sell a portion of their crops on the free market and motivated them to produce more 
surplus agricultural products to maximize their economic revenue. At the end of the 
1970s, China launched systematic economic reforms in order to emphasize a labor-
intensive and export-oriented strategy (Chan, 2010). As a result, the rural reforms also 
freed many rural laborers to pursue employment in more profitable manufacturing sectors
(Chan & Zhang, 1999).
Beginning in the 1990s, China launched a series of regional economic 
development plans to boost economic growth by attracting foreign investment, increasing
exports, and importing high technology products into China. Two of the economic zones 
created by the regional economic development plans—the Pearl River Delta and the 
Yangtze River Delta—especially attracted a large number of rural migrants who were 
seeking employment opportunities (Liang et al., 2014; Mulloy, 2010). Rural to urban 
migration was the dominant source (75%) of urban growth between 1978 and 1999. 
Recent data has shown that in 2009 alone about 44.64 million rural migrant workers 
flowed out of central and western regions to eastern coastal cities for jobs due to the 
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difference in per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP). Beyond these two economic 
development regions, population growth has also been consistently increasing in other 
coastal cities over decades. In many of these cities, labor-intensive industries like 
manufacturing and construction have predominated.
With the emergence of private enterprises and foreign investment companies, 
along with the increasing freedom of urban workers who could choose their own careers, 
many urban residents refused to take low-skilled, dirty, and monotonous jobs. As a result,
these undesirable jobs were rapidly becoming available to rural migrants. Over time, 
more businesses began to realize the benefits of hiring migrant workers who were willing
to take jobs with low pay and fewer benefits in their desire to learn new skills and migrate
permanently. However, the situation began to change when the Chinese government 
realized that both the economic benefits and the social problems that came with their new
policies were disproportionately distributed between rural and urban areas. As a result, 
many changes (e.g. rules regarding the issuing of temporary work permits and the 
provision of employee health benefits) have been made to relax the hukou registration 
policy in order to address issues of inequality and social disadvantages of the rural 
migrants since 2014.
Household Registration System as a Political Mechanism of Control for the 
Distribution of Population
Before the 1950s, the Chinese government had fewer constraints on free 
movement from rural to urban areas (Chan & Zhang, 1999). The 1954 Constitution 
granted citizens’ rights of free residential choice and migration. According to Wu and 
28
Treiman (2004), during the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), in order to fill the needs of 
state enterprises, many of the rural residents who moved to cities did so without 
restrictions. This changed with the passage of the first set of hukou legislation in China, 
which was established by the National People’s Congress in 1958. As previously 
mentioned, in the beginning of the 1950s the Chinese government adopted the Soviet 
model which put a high priority on heavy industry and provided jobs and related welfare 
programs for all urban residents in order to speed up industrialization. In order to achieve 
these goals, the Chinese government encouraged migration to cities where the greatest 
labor needs existed. Conversely, the needs of rural areas were largely ignored (Chan & 
Zhang, 1999). The hukou system was established to prioritize urbanization by providing 
social benefits for urbanites.
The hukou system required each citizen to register in one and only one place of 
regular residence. The most common categories of the hukou registration system were 
non-agricultural areas (cities or towns, or industrial and mining areas) or rural settlements
(villages or state-owned farms). The local regular hukou registration defined a person’s 
rights for many activities in a specified locality. Many social benefits, such as education, 
health care, and retirement compensation, were related to the “status” or type of hukou 
registration that a person possessed. Only the “non-agricultural” hukou holders were 
eligible for these benefits.
The non-agricultural hukou and rural hukou not only defined the place (rural or 
urban) a person came from, but also assigned the type of work he or she did. 
Traditionally, individuals who had a non-agricultural hukou were assigned to work in 
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non-agricultural industries, while individuals who had a rural hukou were assigned 
agricultural work. However, over years of economic and political development, areas that
used to be rural had become urban areas as cities expanded and enveloped them. The 
people from these areas, however, continued to possess rural hukou even though they no 
longer participated in agricultural work. So now, by definition, laborers with a rural 
hukou include two categories: 1) individuals who have rural hukou and who continue to 
do agricultural work, and 2) individuals who have rural hukou and work in non-
agricultural industries. For those who work in non-agricultural industries, they can be: 1) 
individuals who stayed at their hukou registration place; or 2) individuals who moved 
from their rural hukou place to cities, known as rural to urban migrants. In this 
dissertation, the aim is to study this last group, the “rural to urban migrants”.
Until the late 1980s and the early 1990s, urban officials who were accountable for
maintaining and enforcing the hukou system were overwhelmed by the large influx of 
rural migrants and the problems that accompanied that influx. As noted by Chan and 
Zhang (1999), based on the Ministry of Public Security Statistics (1992), the crime rate in
China increased by 6% during the 1990s, and serious crimes increased by 18%. 
Shanghai’s Municipal Police Department reported that migrants committed more than 
70% of thefts in the city. As the influx of peasants4 into cities escalated and came to be 
seen as a serious burden the central government tried various measures to select and 
control the migrant population. The hukou conversion system was the ultimate outcome 
of these efforts and was combined with the hukou registration system in the government’s
4 Shanghai  Municipal  Police  Department  used  the  word  “peasant”  in  referring  to  “rural  to  urban
migrants.”
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attempt to exercise control over China’s internal migration. Understanding the hukou 
conversion process is crucial to understanding the control mechanism of the hukou 
system and its effect on contemporary rural to urban migration.
According to this new process, an individual can convert his or her hukou status 
through: 1) being enrolled in a college or university, 2) being granted urban hukou if one 
is demobilized to a city after serving in the army, 3) being granted urban hukou if 
displaced due to land expropriation, 4) reuniting with immediate family members who 
hold an urban hukou, 5) making a housing purchase or other investment in a city, and 6) 
buying an urban hukou directly from some local government (Chan & Buckingham, 
2008; Baumer, E., & Gustafson, R. 2007). The reality, however, is that the great majority 
of rural migrants have few opportunities to change their hukou because they cannot get 
admitted to a university or join the military, or they lack the necessary urban connection 
or money.
Chan and Wang (1999) indicated the Chinese hukou conversion system is 
comparable to the American immigration “green card” application system except the 
latter is more transparent. Having a permanent urban hukou (converted hukou status from
rural to urban) is equivalent to holding a green card and having all the social benefits that 
come with it. Chan and Wang also note that many rural migrants in China can only 
receive hukou conversion if they become business owners or have personal connections 
with hukou administrators. Gu et al. (2007) have also pointed out that those rural 
migrants with more wealth, education, experiences, and human capital, due to spending a 
relatively long time in urban areas, are more likely to obtain permanent urban hukou. 
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Conversely, those who are less educated or inexperienced migrants (usually the 
temporary and seasonal migrants) cannot afford to purchase a house in urban cities or get 
the urban hukou.
Although the hukou registration system is still important today, as a control 
mechanism on population movement, its importance has diminished in various ways. 
According to Xu and Palmer (2011), the Chinese government issued the Ten Policies for 
Rural Economic Development in the early 1990s, which aimed to loosen control on 
hukou registration and encouraged rural migrants to seek prosperity in the cities. Since 
then, the government allowed non-state owned enterprises to provide migrant workers 
with temporary urban resident cards in order to provide necessary resources to support 
themselves (Liang, 2001). In addition, the “Open Market” policy (1978 and onwards) that
was initiated by Deng Xiaoping replaced the central planning system, resulting in a 
purchase and trade power increase for both rural and urban residents. With the 
decentralization of state owned enterprises and increasing foreign and private enterprises 
in urban areas, people could locate and be relocated based on their employment capacity.
Further reforms on the hukou system were implemented in late 2001, allowing 
medium-sized cities and some provincial capitals to remove the limit on the number of 
rural labors who could apply for permanent hukou (Mackenzie, 2002). In addition, 
alternative residency policies, such as “temporary resident cards”, were also available for 
rural migrants who had work offers in the cities, but who either could not afford (or apply
for), permanent household registration status in urban areas (Taylor, 2011).
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In brief, China’s household registration system had successfully controlled 
internal migration in pursuit of economic, social, and political goals. It complemented 
other administrative policies such as collectivization of farmland and a food rationing 
system in order to create a social, economic, and political segmentation between rural and
urban residents. More recently, the hukou registration system has provided some leeway 
to rural migrants who lack the resources to convert their hukou status to urban.
An Overview of the Demographics of Rural Migration
According to the 1995 China Household Income Project (CHIP), about 10% of 
rural individuals aged 16–35 years left their households in 1995 for at least one month in 
order to work or to search for work in urban areas. The rural migrant population 
increased steadily from 2011 to 2015 (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 1: Rural Migration in China (2011-2015)
Data also show that migrants are more likely to be young and male. Based on the 
2013 Census (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014), rural migrant workers are younger 
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with a higher education level than their cohorts who stay in rural areas. As will be seen 
later, the educational attainment of rural to urban migrants largely occurs after migration. 
There are more male than female migrant workers in both the permanent and temporary 
migrant populations, and rural migrants tend to work in the private sector and 
factory/service industries. Liu et al. (2015) found that rural people who are semi-literate 
are more likely to migrate, while those who have little schooling or a higher level of 
education are less likely to migrate. This indicates that those who have had the least 
schooling were not aware of the opportunities that cities present, while those with more 
education are more likely to obtain prestigious working positions in rural areas. 
According to Gu et al.(2007), both males and females become more likely to become 
migrants as their household size increases. By 2007, rural migration developed quickly 
with excessive concentration (over 60% of rural migrant workers) found in prefectural 
level (higher than provincial level) cities.
Female migrant workers have become the focus of recent migration studies. In the
past, women rural migrants made up a smaller proportion of the overall migrant 
population compared to their male counterparts. For example, according to the 2014 
Census, the gender ratio between male and female rural migrants was 7 to 3. There is 
little research about why there are fewer female rural migrant workers than male rural 
migrants in China. However, two reasons for this sex difference seem likely. One possible
explanation is found in Fischer,’s (1984) study of urban development and migration 
patterns in the United States. In his research, Claude found that the gender differences in 
rural to urban migration appear to result from the varying labor demands that exist during
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different periods of economic development. During periods of industrialization, cities 
have a greater need for manual laborers. Over years of development, the economic needs 
of cities shift away from heavy industry. The services that are in demand during these 
later stages of development are things like clerical work and customer service. During 
these time periods young women are more likely to find opportunities in cities, prompting
them to migrate.
In more recent years, women have begun to escape the traditional family roles 
that they were assigned and seek prosperity in the cities. For example, Liu (2012) 
conducted interviews with 30 married women and found that the motivation for rural 
women migrants to head toward cities is to seek an independent and more valuable life 
for themselves, such as to escape an unhappy marriage or to seek individual development.
The distribution of rural migrants varies by region. According to the National 
Rural Hukou Laborers Report for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014 (published by the 
National Bureau of Statistics), in 2012 there were 111,910,000 laborers with a rural 
hukou who worked in non-agricultural industries in the Eastern Region5. This is an 
increase of 4,010,000 compared to 2011. According to the same sources, in 2012 there 
were a total 82,560,000 laborers with a rural hukou who worked in non-agricultural 
industries in the Middle Region6. This is an increase of 3,140,000 compared to 2011. 
There were a total of 68,140,000 laborers with a rural hukou who worked in non-
5 The Eastern Region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan.
6 The Middle Region includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan.
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agricultural industries in the Western Region7 in 2012, which was an increase of 
2,680,000 compared 2011.
Within the Eastern Region, of all laborers with a rural hukou, 54.9% worked in 
non-agricultural industries. Approximately 20.2% of all laborers with a rural hukou had 
emigrated from their hukou registration location to work in non-agricultural industries 
(rural to urban migrants), while 34.7% of all laborers with rural hukou worked in non-
agricultural industries within their hukou registration location. Within the Middle Region,
of all laborers with a rural hukou, 37.2% worked in non-agricultural industries. In this 
region, approximately 24.3% of laborers with a rural hukou who worked in non-
agricultural industries had emigrated from their hukou registration location, while 12.9% 
of such laborers had not. Within the Western Region, of all laborers with a rural hukou, 
28.7% worked in non-agricultural industries. Of all laborers with a rural hukou, 19.2% 
had emigrated from their hukou registration location to work in non-agricultural 
industries, while 9.5% of all laborers with a rural hukou who worked in non-agricultural 
industries did so within their hukou registration location.
In 2013, the ratio of rural to urban migrants in the Eastern, Middle, and Western 
Regions was approximately 5:3:2. In the same year, of all rural to urban migrants, 
77,390,000 were inter-provincial and 88,710,000 were intra-provincial. In the Middle and
Western Regions, the majority of rural to urban migrants moved to different provinces, 
while in the Eastern Region, the majority of rural to urban migrants moved intra-
provincially. More specifically, 40,170,000 people with a rural hukou left the Middle 
7 The  Western  Region  includes  Inner  Mongolia,  Guangxi,  Chongqing,  Sichuan,  Guizhou,  Yunnan,
Xizang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.
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Region for a new province. Of all these migrants, 89.9% moved to the Eastern Region. 
The Western Region lost a total of 28,400,000 citizens with a rural hukou to inter-
provincial migration. Of all these migrants, 82.7% of them moved to the Eastern Region. 
The Eastern Region had the fewest number of rural migrants emigrating from the region 
(8,820,000). Additionally, of all the inter-provincial rural migrants, most of them moved 
to prefectural level cities8; while of all the intra-provincial migrants, most of them moved 
to county-level cities9.
In 2014, there were approximately 273,950,000 rural to urban migrants in China, 
with 168,210,000 of these being inter-provincial migrants, such as those who migrated to 
Eastern provinces from the Western Region, and 105,740,000 of these being intra-
provincial migrants. The Eastern Region had a total of 106,640,000 rural migrants, the 
Middle Regions had 94,460,000 rural migrants, and the Western Region had 72,850,000 
rural migrants.
As for educational attainment, according to the Rural to Urban Migrants Report 
(2015), between 2004 and 2014, the percentage of rural migrants with a middle school or 
lower education was reduced from 83% to 80.5%, while rural migrants with a high school
education or above increased from 17% to 19.5%. In 2014, 23.8% of rural migrants 
possessed a high school degree or more, as did 26% of inter-provincial migrants. Among 
intra-provincial migrants, the percentage who had a high school degree or more was 
21.4%. More recently, rural to urban migrants born after 1980 (who will be discussed in 
8 According to Qin and Zhang (2014), prefecture level cities are governed either by their provinces or by
their autonomous regions. They are on the second tier of the hierarchy of the Chinese government
organizational  chart  and their  political,  administrative,  and economic level  are just  right  below all
levels of the municipal cities, provinces and autonomous regions.
9 According  to  Qin  and  Zhang  (2014),  county-level  cities  are  sub-units  of  prefectural-level
administrative divisions
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the following section as “new generation migrants”) were primarily moving in order to 
get a higher education. In general, the educational attainment of rural migrants is still 
relatively low compared to that of urban residents.
As far as employment, the majority of rural to urban migrants work in 
construction and what in China are referred to as “tertiary industries”10. In 2014, 56.6% of
the rural migrants were working in construction and manufacturing industries. For those 
who worked in tertiary industries, 11.4% of worked in wholesale and retail sales, 6.5% in 
public transportation and delivery, and 6.0% in hotel and restaurant service. Although the 
majority of rural migrants (83%) were employed in the aforementioned industries, there 
were a total of 17% of self-employed rural to urban migrants.
In 2015, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (2015), 55.1% of rural to 
urban migrants worked in the manufacturing industry. Of all rural migrants, the ratio of 
manufacturing to construction workers was 3:2. Rural migrants accounted for 11.9% of 
people working in wholesale and retail sales; with 10.6% of rural migrants working in 
service industries. It is important to know that the proportion of rural migrants who 
working in tertiary industries increased the fastest in the Middle and Western Regions. In 
the Middle and Western Regions, the percentage of rural migrants who worked in tertiary 
industry increased 1.9% and 3.1%, respectively. Of rural migrants who migrated within 
their hukou registration location, 49.9% of them were working in manufacturing 
industries, while 22.8% of the rural migrants were working in construction.
10 In China, there are “Three Industries” which were designed during the planned economy era but are
still in existence today. The first industry is agriculture, the second is heavy industries, including things
like steel production, manufacturing, and construction, and the third industry (also known as tertiary
industry) indicates white collar work, service, wholesale and retail sales, etc.
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In 2015, the average monthly income of rural migrants increased slightly. Rural 
migrants earned approximately 3,072 yuan (1yuan = 6.7 USD), which was a 208 yuan 
increase compared to 2014. In addition, the average monthly income of rural migrants 
was distributed unevenly across the three regions. At the time, the Eastern Region had the
highest and fastest-increasing income of all three regions. In 2015, the average monthly 
income of rural migrants in the Eastern Region was 3,213 yuan, which was a 247 yuan 
increase compared to 2014. The average monthly income of rural migrants in the Middle 
and the Western Regions, was 2,918 yuan and 2,964 yuan, respectively.
With regard to the living conditions of rural migrants in 2015, 28.7% of them 
were living in dormitory housing which was provided by their employers. 11.1% of rural 
migrants stayed at temporary camps at construction sites. The rest usually lived in rented 
apartments which were close to their work. Overall, the percentage of rural migrants who 
were home owners was relatively low. For example, in 2004, in Shanghai and Beijing, 
home ownership of the rural migrants was only 1%, according to Rosenbaum (2004).
Different Types of Rural Migrants
First and new generation rural migrants. Many researchers have studied the 
first and the new generation of rural migrants and found the main differences between 
these two generations is the level of expectation after migration (Chan & Selden, 2013; 
Liu, 2010; Liu & Cheng, 2008; Liu et al., 2012; Luo & Wang, 2003; Wang, 2010, 2010; 
Wu & Wang, 2014; Zhu & Lin, 2014). The first generation of migration occurred from 
the 1950s through the 1980s and was made up of frontier migrants who grew up in rural 
areas and migrated to cities permanently. The new generation migrants, on the other hand,
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were born after the 1980s and migrated and worked in cities while still possessing a rural 
hukou (Zhu & Lin, 2014). There were distinctive expectations between first generation 
and new generation rural migrants regarding income, housing, social insurance, 
occupational mobility, and urban identification. Zhu and Lin (2013), as well as, Chan and
Selden (2014) found that, compared to first generation migrants (who mainly sought 
employment opportunities in order to send remittance back to their rural homes), the new 
generation rural migrants aspired to more than simple economic gain. This group want to 
develop occupational skills, to earn living wages, to enjoy comprehensive welfare, and to 
achieve the full range of citizenship rights in the cities.
Although the expectations of the new generation migrants were high, Zhu and Lin
(2013) found that these young migrants still faced many social barriers. They found that 
no significant differences existed between the two generations regarding labor contract 
status, monthly income, medical insurance, and urbanite identification. Both of these 
groups had relatively low achievement in each of these areas compared to urban 
residents. Importantly, however, the new generation rural migrants experienced greater 
discrimination both economically and politically because of their hukou status. It was the 
institutional discrimination towards rural migrants that created the greatest difficulties for
the new generation migrants with regard to seeing themselves as urban. For example, first
generation migrants took low paying jobs because those were the only jobs available. In 
contrast, new generation migrants found that high paying jobs, even if available, were 
largely restricted to urban residents, so they ended up taking low paying, labor intensive 
jobs. Another example of the discrimination faced by new generation migrants concerns 
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their children’s education; children of new generation rural migrants were not allowed to 
attend the same schools as children of urban hukou holders11. Because of experiences like
these, new generation migrants have not come to identify themselves as “real” urbanites.
While the new generation of migrants have not been materially better off than first
generation migrants, they have nonetheless come to be seen as emotionally “weaker” than
the first generation migrants. In order to understand this perception of new generation 
migrants a study conducted by Hu (2012) might be helpful. Hu identified four major 
social migration types (including both first and new generation rural migrants); Career 
Builders, Family Helpers, Emotional Explorers, and Lost Followers. Career Builders are 
rural migrants who bear a heavier family burden and/or tend to become business owners 
to climb the social ladder. Family Helpers, are rural migrants who send their income to 
their rural family and lead a hard life in the city. Factory, construction, and service 
industry workers tend to fall in this category. Emotional Explorers are a type of rural 
migrant that seldom or never remits money to their rural family while their own income is
barely sufficient to sustain their urban lifestyle.
Different from Career Builder and Family Helper, Emotional Explorers migrate in
hopes of enjoying city life, although they rarely can afford to do so. The last category, 
Lost Followers are rural migrants who normally follow their families and friends to cities 
without having any specific goals. Hu added that when young migrants are not well-
prepared and have no idea about the challenges and opportunities present in the cities, 
they tend to experience many emotional and physical hardships, thus deviant behaviors 
11 In  China,  the  nine-year  free  education  (primary  to  middle  school)  was  offered  by  the  Chinese
government since 1986. Children of school age will be assigned their district schools by their place of
residence (District, City and Province) and their hukou status. Children who have an urban hukou have
priorities to be assigned to schools compared to children who have a rural hukou.
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could potentially occur. The disjunction between unrealistic expectations and the reality 
confronted when the rural migrants arrive in cities, which is most pronounced among the 
Emotional Explorers and can occur with Lost Followers, is important to defining the 
experience of the new generation migrants.
All of Hu’s migrant types are based on educational attainment, job-hunting 
methods, social networks, remittance behavior, and reasons for migration. First 
generation migrants were more likely to fall in the first two categories. They may be 
illiterate or only have a rudimentary education level. Most of them might also lack 
identification documents, sufficient skills, or employment guidance to relocate, and they 
may have poor physical and mental health. But for them, the opportunity to improve their
social status or their family’s economic situation was welcome and largely 
unaccompanied by unrealistic expectations about the difficulty with which those goals 
might be accomplished. In contrast, the new generation rural migrants fall into all four of 
these categories. In particular, a large percentage of the new generation migrants are 
Emotional Explorers who want to live a fancier city life while they can barely afford to 
live in the cities. Hence, they are more likely to experience emotional turmoil when it 
comes to the differences between what they expected to achieve in cities and the reality 
of their experience. Such emotional distress will be further discussed in Chapter IV.
The first generation migrants are generally pioneers who seek opportunities to 
improve the quality of life for rural families. This group was more likely to work in those 
industries requiring low education and intense labor. However, the new generation 
migrants were more likely to pursue personal achievement rather than overall betterment 
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of their rural families. Compared to their first generation counterparts, the young 
generation has more than economic achievement behind the purpose of migration. They 
seek opportunities to get education, to learn occupational-related skills and become 
urbanite. The fact, however, is that quality of life of both the first and new generation 
migrants is equally challenging. Where the two generations differ is in the greater 
expectations that new generation migrants brought with them to the cities. As will be 
discussed, the greatest problems occur when these new generation migrants are unable to 
achieve their lofty expectations, as a variety of social and psychological problems may 
result.
The permanent, seasonal and temporary migrant. Since the 1990s, the China 
Census has distinguished between permanent, seasonal, and temporary rural migrants. 
There are two types of permanent migrants. The first type includes individuals who 
possess rural hukou and reside in a city for more than a year following the most recent 
Chinese New Year. The second type is composed of individuals who have urban hukou at 
the time of the census. Seasonal rural migrants are individuals who migrate to cities for 
work during those times of the year when there is no work to be done on farms. Lastly, 
temporary rural migrants are individuals who have migrated to cities less than a full year 
following the most recent Chinese New Year. However, a distinction within this category 
is made for the purpose of avoiding double enumeration of individuals at both their rural 
and urban residences within the Census. Individuals who lived in a city for less than six 
months will only be enumerated by their residence at their hukou origins. In contrast, 
individuals who lived in a city for more than six months (but less than one year) will be 
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enumerated by their residence at the destination city. Later, researchers have used this 
taxonomy of rural migrants to study subjects related to migration like motivation for 
migration, the living conditions of migrants, and the long term effects of migration on 
rural migrants.
Compared with temporary migrants, permanent migrants were likely to be older, 
married, well educated, as well as more likely to convert their rural hukou to urban hukou
(Cai & Wang, 2008). Jian and Kun (2007) conducted a survey–in Wuhan, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, and Dongguan, four of the largest migrant receiving cities in mainland China– 
in order to study the different characteristics that exist between first generation and new 
generation rural migrants within the permanent, temporary, and seasonal categories. They
found that although rural migrants were widely distributed across different types of jobs 
in urban China compared to decades ago, seasonal and temporary rural migrants were 
concentrated in the manufacturing and construction sectors regardless of generation. 
Additionally, for both generations, temporary and seasonal migrants were more 
concerned about the income they received from their occupations than permanent 
migrants. The reason for this difference is that seasonal and temporary rural migrants had 
no plan to move to cities permanently; what they wanted was large economic gains in a 
short time period. In contrast, the biggest concern for the permanent rural migrants of 
both generations was the benefits created by social welfare policies that are only available
to urban residents. As a result, rural migrants believed that it was only through hukou 
conversion that they could have good living conditions and education for their children.
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Another important characteristic of permanent migrants that has been noted in 
more recent years, is the proportion of those who are “entrepreneurs” and/or 
“professional personnel” in contrast to both the seasonal and temporary migrants. As Jian 
and Kun (2007) indicated, permanent migrants greatly benefited from their urban resident
status which afforded them a number of social benefits, including career eligibility, 
education, and fewer constraints on bank loans. Compared with the other two types of 
rural migrants, permanent migrants were more likely to have stable jobs, earn higher 
incomes, and have more financial resources (both in terms of start-up investment and 
when applying for bank loans) in order to start their own businesses.
In brief, permanent, temporary and seasonal rural migrants appears to differ in 
terms of long terms and short term goals. Both temporary and seasonal rural migrants 
have no desires to stay in the cities for longer period of time, and they seemed have a 
much stronger connection with their rural families. The primary reason for these two type
of migrants is economic achievement. However, for the last type of migrants (permanent 
rural migrants), besides achieving financial stability and success in the cities, they are 
also looking forward to fully integrating into urban life.
Reasons for Migration
There are many rural and urban policies, personal preferences, and economic 
opportunities in cities that have played, and continue to play, significant roles in rural to 
urban migration. Generally speaking, policies that encouraged local economic 
development and provided settlement benefits attracted more migrants, and these policies
were typically implemented in the Eastern Region in China. As for personal preferences, 
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such as job availability and a high quality urban lifestyle, cities with these amenities are 
typically located in the Eastern Region as well. Therefore, policies and personal 
preferences could work together to push many more rural people to migrate to the Eastern
Region. Other times, however, regional policies outweighed the influence of personal 
preferences, and pushed rural migrants to the Middle and the Western Region, as will be 
discussed in a later section.
The first reason behind rural to urban migration is the improvement of farming 
efficiency and land tenure policies in rural areas that gave farmers much more freedom to
choose to either stay in or leave from rural areas. Since 1958, the state council issued a 
directive that aimed to loosen the rigorous restrictions on population mobility from rural 
to urban areas (Chen, 2011; Ma, 2001). According to Ma (2001), the 1970’s rural reform 
policies greatly improved the farming efficiency, which created surplus agricultural 
laborer in the rural areas (95 million rural population are categorized as surplus labor in 
1984; in 1986, 114 to 152 million surplus labor was seen in rural areas and by 2000, it 
exceeded 300 million). Mullan et al. (2011) discussed that in China, farmlands were 
owned by the state (village collectives officially owned the land), while individual 
households had fixed-term contracts to use the land for their own production activities. 
Over time, the rights of land usage became close to that of private property–with longer 
contracts, reduced frequency of land reallocation, and increased opportunities to rent to 
others. Most of the younger rural people, especially during the off seasons, were more 
likely to go to towns or cities to seek more profitable non-agricultural jobs.
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The second reason is the availability of urban jobs which were associated with 
higher income in the cities. Since the 1990s, the mega-cities (e.g. Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou) have had drastic structural changes in both economic and 
cultural dimensions where numerous urban jobs were available for the rural migrants. 
The average income of rural migrants was significantly higher compared to agricultural 
work, albeit it was lower than urban locales. By conducting surveys in major rural 
migrants receiving cities (including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tianjin) Lu & 
Song (2006) and Zhang (2004) found that factors such as higher income, non-agricultural
job opportunities, higher quality of life, and less burden of taxes and fees than in the 
farmland were the major economic drives behind rural to urban migration.
The third reason behind rural to urban migration is due to business opportunities 
that are widely available in the cities, such as being a business owner as compared to 
being a farmer, or a wage worker. There is some supportive evidence on how becoming 
entrepreneurs could be lucrative when it comes to career options for rural migrants. 
Frijters et al. (2011) found that rural migrants who possessed higher human capital were 
likely to engage in entrepreneurial jobs which normally had better pay. In their study, data
showed that recent migrants (2008 to 2009) earned about 25% more as entrepreneurs than
those who worked in the salary sectors. Current rural migrant entrepreneurs expected a 
30% pay drop should they become salary earners again. In addition, rural migrants were 
three times more likely to be entrepreneurs and six times more likely to “want to be” 
entrepreneurs rather than “happy to be” wage workers. Those who lack social and human 
capital were more likely to become small business owners, such as street vendors. For 
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instance, married people, less educated people, and females were more likely to be 
entrepreneurs.
The fourth reason for rural migration is to improve social upward mobility 
through education and skill training in the cities. Since 1999, the Chinese government has
launched a series of policies on higher education expansion. Most importantly, more 
educated and more experienced migrants tended to become permanent urban residents. In
other words, education determined who would be more apt to stay permanently after 
migration and who would continue to sustain a better socioeconomic status (Hu et al., 
2011). As a result, rural people who migrated for education were increasing over time, 
and rural migrants who were younger and strive for upward mobility were more likely to 
migrate to urban areas for education (Zhou, 2014).
In many urban areas in China, migrants are the predominated groups working in 
construction, joint-venture manufacturing enterprises, or service industries. Although it 
seemed that most of these jobs required very little skills, in the long run, it is somewhat 
promising for those who wanted to move to upper level managerial work or start up their 
own business. Leslie T. Chang, a journalist who wrote about the work and life 
experiences of young women migrant workers in major manufacturing industries in 
China in her report, Factory Girls: From Village to City in a Changing China, discussed 
the reasons behind rural migration of these young women. In her Ted Talk, she stated,
…"Chinese workers are not forced into factories because of
our insatiable desire for iPods. They choose to leave their 
homes in order to earn money, to learn new skills, and to 
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see the world. In the ongoing debate about globalization, 
what’s been missing is the voices of the workers 
themselves." (September, 2012)
One of her interviewees described her own personal growth after migration, 
“When I went home for the New Year, everyone said I had changed. They asked me, what
did you do that you have changed so much? I told them that I studied and worked hard. If
you tell them more, they won’t understand anyway.” Another girl said “Now, after I get 
off work, I study English, because in the future, our customers won’t be only Chinese, so 
we must learn more languages.” Through migration, it created opportunities for social 
mobility for millions of rural people through skills training and education, especially 
young people from rural areas.
The excitement of enjoying city life could be another reason for migration. 
Migrant workers who hoped to become city residents tended to seek for prosperity from 
both economic and lifestyle perspectives, such as higher income, a better living condition,
and education for children so as to avoid the heavy burden of labor on farms (Akay, 
Bargain, & Zimmermann, 2012). Bao et al. (2009) indicated that rural to urban migrants, 
especially those moved from a long distance, have moved coast-ward not only to seek 
employment but also to enjoy city life. In other words, the longer the distance, the 
stronger the pursuit of economic betterment and urban lifestyle. However, unlike the 
claim, studies found insignificant improvement on quality of life and overall well-being 
after these rural workers’ migration (Wang et al. 2010; Zhang et al., 2009). These authors 
suggested that rural migrants encountered various social barriers and challenges to meet 
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goals. Therefore, most of them tended to migrate for education and non-agricultural work
at the very beginning, and hoped to achieve better quality of life later (Liang et al., 2014; 
Zhu & Lin, 2014).
In addition to these economic and social incentives that have attracted more and 
more rural migrants, studies also showed how local networks helped rural migrants to 
decide where to move. Liu et al. (2015) found that local networks played significant roles
for rural migrants who decided to stay in cities either temporarily or permanently. Bao et 
al. (2009) focused on two different determinants—destination social network and foreign 
direct investment (FDI)—and found that past migration and destination FDI substantially 
influenced current migration decisions. Migrants preferred to move to provinces with 
migrant connection and with higher amount of FDIs. Li and Zahniser (2002) also 
concurred that the presence of a family member or a friend in the prospective destination 
city reduced the costs of migration while it provided social and psychological support.
Other than understanding the reasons for rural to urban migration, it is important 
to note that migrants also made an impact in the places where they choose to move. Liu et
al. (2015) pointed out that migrants’ destination preference altered the spatial distribution 
of China’s urbanization to a great extent. Areas with more rural migrants were also prone 
to have better fiscal policies and employment opportunities. Cai and Wang (2008) found 
that from 1987 to 2000, most migrants went to the urban cities in the eastern coastal 
areas, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Fujian. Cai and Wang further
discussed that a dense population concentration alternated economic scales within a 
certain specific spatial unit (east coastal cities and inland regions) with an increase of 
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urban and human services supplies, and a decrease of agricultural and ecological 
production in the highly advanced eastern and impoverished western emigration areas 
(Cai &Wang, 2003).
Most importantly, migrants’ preference has reinforced the scale advantage of the 
mega-cities, prompted the size divergence of medium and large-scaled cities, and 
changed the hierarchical structure and spatial organization of China’s urban system (Liu 
et al., 2015). Additionally, migrants’ destination preference also facilitated the rise of the 
inland regions. According to Liu et al. (2015), in small and medium sized cities and 
towns, rural migrants were the driving engine of local economic development. In 
conclusion, rural to urban migration has altered the spatial distribution of China’s urban 
system to such a great extent that the economic scale of the mid-West Region has 
substantially grown.
Changing Patterns of Rural to Urban Migration
Changing patterns of rural migration in contemporary China can be summarized 
in five stages as seen in Figure 2, below. The first stage was during the 1950s and 1960s 
when China underwent an economic economy and central planning era. During this 
period of time, there was very limited migration happening between rural and urban area. 
The second stage was during the 1960s and 1970s when there was a decreased migration 
from rural to urban areas. As a matter of fact, there was an increasing population 
migration from urban to rural areas due to the “Cultural and Moral Reform” under Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution The third stage was during the early 1980s and early 1990s when the 
Household Registration system became loosen due to the need for industrialization in the 
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cities. The Fourth stage was from the late 1990s to early 2000s when there were increased
labor needs during urbanization. In the early 2000s, the majority of rural migrants moved 
to the Eastern Region because of its migrant-friendly policies and urban lifestyle. For 
instance, the Yangtze River Delta, where the earliest and most advanced economic 
development occurred (and having the least farmland), had the largest in-migrant 
population and most salient population expansion. According to Liu et al. (2015), at the 
time, these coastal regions attracted rural migrants due to availability of non-agricultural 
employment opportunities, urban amenities, and urban lifestyle. Eastern coastal provinces
were the most dynamic economic regions where liberal economic policies were featured, 
such as a tax-free zone, which attracted both domestic and foreign investors. For instance,
in just the five years after the opening of four special economic zones in 1986, 14 coastal 
cities were designated as “Open Development Zones” and were thus granted the favor of 
special policies, such as tax incentives for joint-venture enterprises. According to Liang 
(2001), several coastal provinces in China (e.g. Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong) had the highest proportion of temporary migrants. Liang (2001) also 
addressed the fact that there were substantial numbers of temporary migrants residing in 
nearly every coastal province in China.
More recently, however, the Chinese government initiated a series of policies (e.g.
tax elimination on agricultural products and new incentives to attract rural migrant 
entrepreneurs to reinvest in locals) with the intention to divert rural migrants to the 
Middle and Western Regions (Liang et al., 2014). Liang also mentioned that the 
percentage of farming labor has declined in a significant manner in the Western Region 
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due to the growing economic and educational opportunities within each province that 
provided better and cost effective options for rural migrants.
Figure 2: Geographical Migratory Patterns in Contemporary China
When looking at the regional (Eastern, Middle, and Western) migration, both 
inter-provincial and intra-provincial migration were largely influenced by factors such as 
labor needs, distance advantage (especially transportation convenience), and the 
continually increasing wage gap (Shen, 2011; Yang & Goldstein, 1990). In the Central 
and Western Regions, settings with better equipped urban amenities became more 
attractive to rural migrants. According to Liu et al. (2015), in the Central and the Western 
Regions, places with a higher economic development level and at a higher administrative 
level attracted many more migrants (both rural and urban migrants). This demonstrates 
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how the Chinese government allocated economic resources and promoted regional 
development in inland China.
A trend of migration return (retraction of emigrants back to their home provinces),
since 2008, is another example of how policy has influenced migration patterns. During 
the 2008 economic recession, the Chinese government shifted the economic plan from 
labor intensive to capital intensive, which resulted in a large amount of surplus labor in 
the Eastern Region. As a result, there was a rising migration trend toward the Middle and 
Western Regions. Hu et al. (2011) and Knight (2008) explained that migrants helped to 
reduce rural/urban inequality due to the fact that rural migrants earn more money in cities
and send remittances back to the countryside. In their research, variables include the 
distance between the village and the township, the distance between the village and 
countryside, and the ratio of average local farm income to average net income of the 
village. Hu et al. (2011) found that those villages which were not economically active and
were far from local economic centers were less attractive to return migrants, and thus had
“push” effects in the decision to emigrate. They also found that whether migrants choose 
to return or not depended on individual or socioeconomic characteristics (such as 
individual education level and household wealth), as well as factors related to destination 
policies either supporting or against the rights of rural migrants.
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CHAPTER IV 
PROBLEMS OF RURAL TO URBAN MIGRANTS IN CHINA
There was a complicated relationship between Chinese central government and 
rural areas with regard to policy preferences towards urban versus rural. Before the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rural people were the major 
driving force for the victory of PRC. However, after the 1980’s economic reforms, the 
PRC turned away from rural people and granted privileges to the urban residents as their 
interest group (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 2008). This resulted in benefits from the economic
growth not being fairly distributed between urban and rural residents (Cheng & Wang, 
2015; Gu et al. 2007; Lu & Song, 2016; Rosenbaum, 2004). Rural migrants earned less 
money, received far fewer benefits, had less upward mobility, fewer legal rights, and less 
legal protection. More so, rural residents were not eligible for public education, medical 
care, or housing compensation at both rural and urban areas; encountering many 
restrictions on employment, urban settlement, and hukou conversion, as well. Issues 
related to citizen rights, social exclusion, urban-rural income gap, and psychological 
issues were found empirically to be related to marginalized life of rural migrants in the 
cities (Feng, Zuo & Ruan, 2002; Li, 2006; Li & Chui, 2011; Lu & Song, 2006; Meng & 
Zhang, 2001; Yang, 1993; Akay, Bargain, & Zimmermann, 2012), as will be further 
discussed in the following section.
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Citizenship and Human Rights of Rural Migrants
According to Rosenbaum (2004), a full range of citizen rights should include 
social membership, community belonging, and the right of resource sharing. Rural 
migrants in China face significant challenges to realize all these essential aspects of the 
citizen rights in cities, even though they were the same national origin as the urban locals.
Sollinger (1999) conducted research to compare the citizenship and human rights issue on
migrant population in Germany, Japan, and China. He pointed out that the major issues 
related to rules of entry and stay in terms of who can enter the country and who can 
obtain residency of various kinds, civic and social privileges, and fair treatment of 
migrant workers were important to solve citizen right issues. His historical review 
specifically aimed to explain issues of rural migration under the Chinese context, a 
comparison between the illegal immigrants in the US and rural to urban migrants who do 
not have legal documents (Hukou registration in China) and certificates (working permits
in China) to legally reside in the cities. Although the economic growth and urbanization 
demanded large amounts of laborers from rural areas, the procedure to obtain legal 
residency (both temporary and permanent) for rural migrants was both difficult and 
uncertain. These economic barriers further enlarged the rural-urban socio-economic 
disparity. Thus, rural residents received unfair treatment from the state, as China, since 
the 1980s, benefited greatly from an urban development strategy which provided cheap 
labor without providing sufficient social benefits for the contributors–especially the rural 
migrants–in return. Once again, the hukou system is the primary barrier for rural migrants
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to achieve equal citizen rights (Cai, 2008; Feng et al., 2002; Liang et al., 2014; Mulloy, 
2010).
The hukou system encompassed far more than simply controlling urban 
population and labor mobility. Rather, it was a social control mechanism and a main tool 
to exclude rural people from accessing state-provided goods, welfare, and entitlements 
(Chan, 2010). As Liang (2001) discussed, during the economic reform era, the state 
allowed rural people to work in the cities under conditions that they would present valid 
identifications allowing them to stay and work. All migrants were subjected to report 
their hukou status to local administrative authorities, especially the Public Safety Office 
(which is equivalent to the city police department in the US). For those who moved to 
urban cities temporarily (less than 6 month) and/or permanently, they had to present 
evidence of employment, school registration or a special permit granted by an urban 
hukou registration authority, such as a permit specific to seasonal migrants. Rural migrant
workers without any forms of authorized documents would be considered “illegal 
migrants” and were subject to arrest and eviction.
Zhu and Lin (2013) suggested that China’s hukou system favored urban residents 
and left rural people out of social benefits and protection. People with a rural hukou were 
prevented from accessing all types of social benefits made available to urban residents. 
As a recent article in The Economist reported, “… it is far harder for a member of this 
group to gain official recognition as a city-dweller in his own country, with all the welfare
benefits and access to public services that status confers, than to gain citizenship in 
America or Europe if he were to migrate there” (The Economist, 2014, April 19).
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Nowadays, rural migrants still have difficulties accessing civil and social welfare 
only afforded to their urban local counterparts (Che et al., 2013; Sollinger, 1999; 
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik et al., 2004). Che et al. (2013) noted the lack of institutional 
protection within the working environment where rural migrants tended to be. Although 
the national Trade Union Law of 1992 demanded that all firms set up trade unions, the 
factories where rural migrant workers tend to work either have not established unions or 
their unions do not have sufficient protective policies for rural workers. As a 
consequence, problems such as low income, low participation of social security system, 
inadequate housing subsidies for rural migrants have not fundamentally changed. The 
Chinese government has made efforts to protect the rights of rural laborers in China, 
especially after multiple cases involving police brutality towards rural migrants. These 
efforts included new policies on social integration, a relaxed household registration 
system, and state connection and state sector employment opportunities (Che et al. 2013).
However, the problem continues to exist, the fundamental civil rights for quality of life 
are not evidently granted to rural migrants.
Social Exclusion and Discrimination Towards Rural Migrants
Kuitenbrouwer (1973) defined social exclusion as a state of relative deprivation 
and involuntary exclusion of an individual’s participatory role in a society. In China, 
social exclusion continues to be a process of exclusion that prohibits rural migrants from 
participating in some areas of social life, and a continuing isolation and discrimination 
towards this disadvantaged group. Wong and Song (2007) identified three types of social 
exclusions towards rural migrants: 1) an involuntary exclusion from participation in one 
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or more spheres of life (e.g. socio-cultural, political, and economic); 2) a state of relative 
deprivation characterized by poor housing conditions, lack of opportunity for education, 
poor health conditions, inadequate access to improve income and employment 
opportunities; 3) a process of exclusion in areas of social life that are viewed as 
fundamental citizen rights in any given society. For instance, rural migrants rarely have 
the opportunities of being involved in political and/or government sectors. Huang and Yi 
(2014) conducted a qualitative research study which focused on rural migrants who 
stayed at a basement apartment in Beijing. Basement renting in Beijing is a common way 
of institutional exclusion to deny the rights of affordable and quality housing for rural 
migrant workers. The authors pointed out that the housing exclusion policy was due to 
three major modes of marginalization. Firstly, rural migrants were considered an inferior 
social class by urban residents and employment sectors in the cities; secondly, derogatory
labeling towards rural migrants exacerbated the discrimination and social exclusion on 
both their rights of employment and rights of housing; thirdly, very few social policies 
addressed the needs and benefits of rural migrants.
Children of rural migrants are also excluded from main society, because their 
parents cannot afford their housing, food, and education in the cities. Recently, news 
media focused on the issue of these children of rural migrants, calling them "left-behind 
children" as they grew up in rural areas while their parents were away in cities working as
rural migrant workers. The reasons vary as to why these migrant workers leave their 
children behind, but a major reason was that the children with rural hukou cannot attend 
the schools where they would reside (in the cities) and cannot get appropriate health care.
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Thus, these children left behind without parental care could possibly experience 
tremendous psychological stress. A recent article, published in The Economist (2015, 
October 15), informed that “left behind children” and rural migrant children make up an 
estimated 40% of all Chinese children. Other than lack of parenting and appropriate 
education, these left behind children also reportedly experienced sexual abuse, physical 
abuse, and psychological disorders. As many researchers and commentators indicated, 
hukou registration and its restrictions on the benefits and privileges rural hukou holders 
are the primary causes of the "left behind children" problem.
A documentary film released in 2014, made by US journalist, Jocelyn Ford, 
Nowhere to Call Home, told a story of a female Tibetan farmer, torn between her 
traditional way of life and desires for her son to have a better future in the city. It 
explicitly demonstrated how discrimination from urban residents toward rural migrants 
had created devastating consequences. As the film portrayed, the important role of the 
rural migrants, as a social growing force, was not recognized. Rather, they were 
frequently criticized as a threat to social order and often associated with the increase in 
crime rates in urban cities. Experiences of social exclusion were associated with 
discriminations that rural migrants have received from urban locals. Rural migrants are 
also perceived as competing with unemployed urban residents and were labeled as 
“outsiders” and more derogatorily, labeled as “stupid” and “ignorant”. It is very common 
for them to be mistreated with verbal disrespect, deliberate avoidance, and experiences in 
the delay of payments from employers. As a consequence, the hostility toward rural 
migrants has furthered their marginalized life experiences in the cities. Guan and Liu 
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(2014) studied discriminations and social stigmatizations toward rural to urban migrants 
by measuring objective mechanisms (institutional discrimination and prejudice) from 
urban locals, and subjective mechanisms (perceived discrimination, subtle prejudice, 
discriminatory experiences) of the rural migrants. The study showed that urban residents 
tended to associate images of rural migrants with unattractive physical appearance, 
potential perils of disease or crime, and discredited places of origin.
Han (2010) studied administrative prejudices of the Chinese police force towards 
rural to urban migrants, and found that rural to urban migrants have been treated and 
continue to be treated and seen as a stigmatized social group. First and foremost, there 
were some biases towards rural migrants. Rural migrants have been seen as ignorant 
because of lower socioeconomic status, as well as their lesser resemblance to urbanites, 
and they have been assumed to commit more crimes. Because of these biased images, 
they encountered extreme discrimination and unfair treatment from the public safety 
sectors, especially the police force. In China, a special force of the law enforcement has 
been established since the 1990s in order to monitor and check the status of the rural 
migrants. Rural migrants were subject to being checked, harassed, and even arrested if 
they lacked any type of permit to stay in the cities where they worked. In fact, in recent 
years, there were multiple high profile cases of violent confrontations between public 
safety officers and rural migrants who were under suspicion of lacking the legal permits 
to stay in cities. It raised concerns in public discourse regarding migration, public safety, 
and police brutality issues, and ultimately the stability of society.
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The status disadvantages of the rural migrants further deepened the 
socioeconomic gap from urban locals. This implicitly created a social stratification of the 
superiors (urban) and inferiors (rural). Under these social stigmas, rural migrants 
responded in different ways. Some of the migrants did not view themselves 
contemptuously and expressed positive feelings about their lives as migrants. In contrast, 
other migrants tended to respond to these discriminations in a negative way, including 
blaming fate, stigma reversal, and pursuit of self-efficacy by committing crimes (Han ,
2010).
Economic Exclusion and Discrimination Experienced by the Rural Migrants
Rural migrants were largely excluded from highly paid occupations and/or better 
working environments. Unlike urban residents, rural migrants were mainly concentrated 
in service and construction industry (Knight, Song, & Jia, 1999). Moreover, most migrant
workers took physically demanding jobs as manual laborers, or as workers in textile, 
garment, and toy factories, etc. (Blum et al., 2001; Frijters et al., 2011; Golley & Meng, 
2011; Lu et al. 2013; Xinhua & Kun, 2007). According to Li (1996), 80% of rural 
migrants worked at “dirty, heavy, and dangerous jobs”. Some jobs were state-owned work
units with a short term contract–without providing regular staff housing or pension for 
their contractual workers. As Demurger et al. (2009) found, urban residents were given 
social privilege to work in formal and nation-owned sectors with stable contracts and 
comprehensive benefit packages. However, as rural migrants, at the bottom of social 
hierarchy, they had to choose work that might be risky, or depend on informal revenues, 
sometimes illegal, and still barely afford their lives in the cities.
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In addition, rural migrants were also excluded from state recruitment avenues 
both at the pre-migration and post-migration stages. The majority of rural migrants found 
their jobs either through private recruiters or informal networks of their rural migrant 
friends which showed that the government had not provided sufficient settlement services
to help rural migrants to relocate. For instance, in 2004, a study was conducted in a major
rural migrant receiving city; Jian and Kun (2007) found that although employment 
services provided by governments have been improved, the informal employment 
information channels have been the major avenues rural migrants use to find jobs in the 
cities. In addition, they found that in the process of job searching, migrant workers could 
find jobs more quickly when facilitated by relatives, acquaintances, fellow townsmen, 
and by using other personal relations, than when not being facilitated by these personal 
ties. State assistants had no effect in helping them to find stable employment.
Because of the occupational disparity, the rural to urban income gap is becoming 
a major problem. Though the overall income has significantly improved between the rural
locals and the rural to urban migrants over years, the income gap between the rural 
migrants and urban locals has widened. According to Knight and Ding (2012), the median
wage of migrants was 54% of urban locals in 2012. In 2002, the average income per 
capita of rural to urban migrant households was not only higher but also nearly doubled 
that of rural households, although approximately 35% lower than that of urban 
households. According to Demurger et al. (2009), the annual earnings of urban residents 
in 2009 was 1.3 times higher than long term rural migrants (rural migrants who stayed in 
urban areas for more than 1 year or converted their rural hukou to urban) earnings. 
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Sicular and his associates (2007) studied the magnitude and trends of the urban-rural 
income gap between 1995 and 2002. They found that the rural-urban income gap was 
rising from the Western to the Middle Region though it declined in the Eastern coast. 
They concluded that spatial differences in prices and the cost of living were the major 
contribution of this rural-urban income gap. Meng and Bai (2007) pointed out that the 
income gap between rural migrants and urban locals was associated with labor 
immobility. Rural migrants have less education and less skills when they come into cities 
and as a result, most rural migrants tended to work in those industries having the lowest 
pay and least benefits.
The lack of legal protection and guaranteed social benefit toward rural migrants 
further demonstrated the economic exclusion that migrants experienced in the cities. 
According to The National Report on Rural Migrant Workers published by the Chinese 
Ministry of Labor, in 2015, the rate of delayed paychecks was slightly increasing 
compared to 2014, where the Eastern Region had the lowest rate of delayed paychecks, 
while the Western Region had the highest rate of delayed paychecks. In addition, of all 
the industries where rural migrant workers tend to work, the construction industry had the
highest rate of delayed paychecks. Of all the other industries, the rate of delayed 
paychecks was also increasing. This resulted in an increase of 9,788 yuan of average 
delayed paychecks in 2015 (1 yuan = 6.86USD)12, based on the currency exchange rate 
dated December 3. 2016.
12 In 2015, the average monthly income of rural migrants in the Eastern region was 3,213 yuan, and 2,918
yuan in the Middle Region, and 2,964 yuan in the Western Region.
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Psychological and Physical Health Issues with Urban Migrants
Both psychological and physical health issues are becoming much more prevalent 
among young rural migrant workers. Concerns such as infectious diseases, mental health, 
occupational health, and women’s health are emerging public health concerns related to 
migration (Mou et al., 2013). As previously mentioned, rural migrants experienced many 
social exclusion and discrimination in cities. Even worse, the psychological 
marginalization was most detrimental, preventing rural migrants from social integration 
and healthy urban growth. Research showed that the common factors that contribute to 
the psychological marginalization of the rural migrants were sleep disturbance, poor 
physical health, anxiety, depression, and social isolation (Wong & Song, 2007).
For male rural migrant workers, longer working hours, lower income, older age, 
and labor-intensive jobs were associated with a high risk of mental health issues. 
According to a study by Qiu et al. (2011), there has been a high prevalence of depressive 
symptoms among migrant workers who mainly engaged in labor intensive jobs. They 
found that proximal factors associated with depressive conditions included self-rated 
health, self-rated economic status, and city adaptation status. High income and increased 
use of social support resources were associated with reduced risk of poor mental health 
(Sullivan et al., 2011; Keung Wong et al., 2007; Li et al., 2014; Ng et al., 2014; Zhang et 
al., 2009; Akay, Bargain, & Zimmermann. 2012). Zhong et al. (2015) conducted research 
to examine the relationship between Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and being rural 
migrant workers in Shenzhen, Guangdong. The research included 3,031 migrant workers 
from 10 manufacturing factories, and found that the risk factors for lifetime MDD 
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included: lower education, poor living condition, poor self-perceived physical health, 
early migration before adulthood (18 years), lack of emotional support, and working 
overtime.
Compared to older migrants, younger migrants may have lower levels of social 
support and weaker social networks. This is because the younger rural migrants tended to 
have a shorter time of stay in cities, thus lacking time and opportunity to form local friend
groups. More so, the discrepancy between pre-migratory expectation and post-migratory 
reality may lead to a sense of loss, which could negatively impact mental health amongst 
young migrants. Additionally, rural migrants could be vulnerable to discrimination and 
stigmatization from many social and political actors; they could also become stressed 
over an inability to find work, places to stay, or affordable health care (Gong et al., 2012).
In conclusion, research found various indicators associated with psychological and 
physical health of amongst Chinese migrant workers, such as working and living 
conditions, economic status, social support, experiences of being stigmatized or 
discriminated, and unrealized expectations.
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CHAPTER V
RURAL MIGRATION AND CRIME
Rural to Urban Migration and Crime in China
According to Nielsen and Smyth (2008), crimes skyrocketed in China between the
late 1980s and 1990s, and have increasingly become a major concern for public safety. 
Between 1988 and 1995 homicide conviction has increased by 71%. Assaults, robbery, 
and serious theft have increased 171%, 351%, and 237%, respectively (Guo, 1996). 
Madsen (2012) also found that since 1978 the crime rates in China have risen by 300%. 
Not only have crime statistics indicated this surging crime trend, Chinese citizens also 
expressed their concerns toward crime increases. For example, a 1991 national survey 
asked respondents about their concerns of public safety, and two-thirds of the respondents
rated very high concerns regarding crime and social instability. It is worth noting that 
during the time when crime rates were increasing was the same time period of the first 
wave of migration, as well as the economic reform in China. Research indicates that there
is a relationship between crime and urbanization, especially considering the continuing 
growth of migrants (Dutton, 1997).
Rural Migrants Overrepresented in Criminal Offenses in China
Official data and scholarly research have indicated that migrants are 
overrepresented as offenders in contemporary urban China. The relationship between 
rural migration and crime is referred to as the “three high[s]”–high crime rates, high 
arrest rates, and high incarceration rates (China Daily, 2014). Peng and Long (2010) 
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stated that in 2008, the rural migrant defendants made up at least 70% of the total 
criminal defendants of the entire nation. From 2006 to 2010, the crime rate of rural 
migrants increased 21.7% compared to 2001-2005 (The China Broadcast, 2012). Rural 
Migrant and Crime–Research and Report (2014)13 showed that rural migrants tended to 
commit serious crimes, such as robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, forcible rape, and 
sex trafficking, as well as gang related crime. Guo (2011) found that rural migrants were 
likely to commit both property related and violent crimes, with theft and robbery being 
the most prevalent crimes committed by rural migrants. Chen (2008) studied substance 
abuse issues among rural to urban migrants in China, and found that substance use among
rural migrant workers varied across workplaces. The top four tiers of business having 
above-average use of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs were construction companies, 
night clubs, massage parlors, and hair salons. In addition, gender played a significant role
in substance abuse. Female migrant workers who worked at construction companies or 
night clubs have higher rates of substance use, especially illegal drug use.
According to the same report, crimes were particularly prevalent in the major 
rural migrant receiving cities. By the end of 2014, Guangdong had a total population 
13,085,000 with a migrant population of 7,360,000. There were a total of 55,499 criminal
defendants between 2008 and 2010, of which migrant defendants were 43,418 (78.23%). 
In 2008, the convicted population was 18,159 and the migrant defendants were 14,449 
with 79.57% of the entire convicted population; in 2009, the convicted population was 
20,158 in total and the migrant defendants were 15,673; and in 2010, the convicted 
13 The China University of Political Science and Law, a leading legal education and research institute,
teamed up with their collaborators and published the report. 
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population was 17,182 in total and migrant defendants were 13,296. The conviction rate 
of migrant defendants was 77.5% for both 2009 and 2010. The average conviction rate of 
migrant defendants during 2008 to 2010 was 79.57%14. In Guangzhou and Shenzhen, two
of the largest economic centers of the Guangdong province, migrants made up 80% to 
90% of crime offenders (Guangzhou Police Bureau Research Team, 2002).
The total migrant population in Tianjin is 5,003,500 which was approximately 
80% of entire population (2015 The Tianjin Census Survey)15. Zhang (2014) addressed 
the prevalence of rural migrant offenders in Tianjin. By rates of criminal offense, 
migrants were made up of 25% in 1993 and 28% in 1994; from January to April of 1995, 
the convicted migrants reached 31% of the entire criminal conviction population. From 
2003 to July, 2008, the total number of arrested migrants was 30,200; a 30% annual 
increase. In 2011, the convicted migrant defendants had risen as high as 87.67%.
Shanghai is also on the high crime list. Han et al. (2014) studied a total of 6,887 
offenders from 1997 to 2006 in Shanghai. Based on their research, most of the migrant 
offenders came from four tiers of major emigration regions. The first tier is the western 
areas where have criminal offender under 100 people in total. Xinjiang, Heilong, Jiang, 
and Guangxi are the three provinces with the highest number of migrant offenders from 
the first tier region. The second tier includes provinces such as Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and 
Henan in which the total number of criminal offenses committed by migrants are between
100 and 400 in total. The third tier includes provinces like Jiangsu and Sichuan, in which 
the total number of migrant offenders is between 700 and 800 in total, which represents a 
14 The Guangzhou Inferior and Intermediate courts.
15 The Tianjin Census Survey is one part of the record from “Administration and Management of Migrant
Population in Tianjin” from the Tianjin Public Safety Office.
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22.31% of the entire sample population. The fourth tier is Anhui Province which has a 
total 2,330 migrant offenders, and represents 33.83% of the entire sample population. 
There was no other replication or reexamination on this subject matter, but the findings 
are definitely suggestive of who would be likely to be charged as criminal offenders.
Characteristics of the Rural Migrant Offenders
Chang and Li (2014) found that the majority of the rural migrant offenders, in 
2013, were between 18 and 49, but the national average peak age ranged between 18 and 
29. In addition, rural migrant offenders tended to have low education backgrounds. In 
their study, 70% of them have middle school or lower education. The Guangzhou Inferior
and Intermediate Courts (2010) reported that rural migrants were more likely to commit 
serious offenses. For example, in 2008, the total number of rural migrant defendants who 
committed these crimes was 939 out of 1,193 cases. Among these serious offenses, most 
were reportedly committed under the heat of passion, such as anger, jealousy, or feelings 
of being mistreated. Gao (2011) found most crimes committed by rural migrants were for 
money, curiosity, brotherhood, or revenge. Guo (2011) studied the characteristics of the 
rural migrant offenders and summarized the following key features of them. First, rural 
migrant offenders tended to be new generation migrants who were working in a 
temporary positions in manufacturing (45.8%) and the service industry (36.5%). Second, 
the locations of the offenses have also been systematically distributed at street corners, 
rented houses, hotels and internet cafes. Third, crimes against locals were 58% versus 
23.1% against other rural migrants. Fourth, rural migrants were more likely to commit 
crimes with co-defendants, who came from the same rural areas.
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The characteristics of the rural migrant offenders have also been studied 
extensively by legal institutions in China. In a study conducted by Beijing Political and 
Legal University and Criminal Offenses and Recourse Center (2015), 191 cases and 151 
migrant defendants was collected from the legal services records from legal firms in 
Beijing, Shanxi, Henan, Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Special District, Shandong, 
Hebei, Qinghai, Tianjin and 10 more provinces and municipalities in China. The study 
aimed to examine the characteristics of the criminal offenses, the causes of crime, the 
causes of victimization, and the criminal court procedures, as well as to offer suggestions 
on prevention and protection of the marginalized population.
In this legal report, variables related to characteristics of the rural migrant were 
age, gender, educational background, and current employment status. In addition, 
criminal offenses from high to low were categorized as ordinal variables, including: 
robbery (34 people), theft (30 people), assault (14 people), rape (6 people), sex trafficking
(5 people), and traffic law violations (8 people). Most of the rural migrant defendants 
(78.26%) did not have prior criminal records. Twenty people had prior criminal records 
and represented 17.36% of the entire sample. Some of the explanations of the criminal 
intentions related to economic deprivation, disputes in the working place, personal 
disputes with victims, and lack of legal consciousness. The prevalence of sex related 
criminal offenses largely committed by the new generation rural migrants was another 
major finding from this report. For instance, in a total of 115 migrant defendants, 10 out 
of 12 people accused of sex offenses were new generation migrants. According to the 
researchers, lacking sex and moral education were the leading criminal factors. Organized
71
crime was another highlight from the report, where 70 out of 115 defendants (60.87%) 
were involved with organized crimes.
The legal report also addressed issues related to criminal procedures and legal 
services available to rural migrant defendants and victims. The criminal investigation and
prosecution period typically lacks sufficient legal supports for rural migrant workers. 
When looking at the data of criminal conviction, rural migrant workers were more likely 
to receive imprisonment than non-imprisonment sentences. For example, of the 115 total 
criminal defendants, only 24 (20.87%) received sentences equivalent to probation. Sixty-
six people received imprisonment sentences of 3 years and below, whereas 25 people 
received 3 years and above for imprisonment, life sentences, or the death penalty. All in 
all, the prison sentence is as high as 79.13% while non-imprisonment sentences presented
20.87%.
Studies based on surveys from other cities have also offered possible 
explanations. Li (2004) studied the characteristics of crime and rural migration in Gulou 
district in Nanjing, China, and concluded that the major crimes rural migrants committed 
were property related crime. As Li described, the Gu Lou district is becoming a central 
business and entertaining center for both locals and newcomers. Although Li didn’t 
specify what types of migrants (urban to urban or rural to urban) are more likely to 
commit crime, he did address multiple characteristics which match the description of 
rural migrants in literature of migration and crime in China. In his study, a total of 360 
theft and burglary cases were examined in 2004. The migrant population committed or up
to 62% of these crimes. An interesting finding from his research is that among the crimes 
72
which are non-property related, the migrant population committed only up to 47% of the 
crimes. Li and Chui (2011) suggested that crime is a form of resistance for the rural 
migrants against China’s policy on rural to urban migration. The study found that the 
social policies had very minimal effects on improving the overall quality of life of rural 
migrants in the cities. As a consequence, forms of resistance, especially crimes, have been
resorted to by rural migrants as ways of expressing anger and injustice. Studies (Lu & 
Chui, 2011) also showed that rural migrants were often treated poorly by their employers,
including delay of salary payment, occupational discriminations and no protection of 
workers’ rights. When some rural migrants were unable to receive their salary or deserved
benefits, they committed crimes such as theft, property damage, or even more serious 
types of offenses, such as assault and murder (Han & Yu, 2008; Huang, 2010). Other 
studies demonstrated how stress and desperation lead many rural migrants to deviant and 
criminal behavior. Chen (2008) found that female workers who worked in places of 
entertainment and personal services involving prostitution were highly likely to 
experience risk for stress and depression, which caused higher substance usage rates. In 
Lee & Zhao’s (2017) study, a survey was carried out in a coastal city prison for people 
who committed property related crimes. Within the incarcerated population, two-thirds 
out of 233 rural migrant defendants possessed only several hundred yuan (at the time of 
the research, 1 yuan was equal to approximately 7.1 US dollars) when they arrived in 
cities. Most of them reported that the main reason for committing crime was because of 
disparity, such as lack of money for food or places to stay. The majority of the 
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respondents reported that they could not find a job for a long time, or were not paid on 
time by their employers.
Different from previous research, which focused on the characteristics of the rural
migrants, researchers also studied the legal response of the criminal justice system. Zhao 
(2000) suggested that the overwhelming number of criminal convictions of the rural 
migrants only reflected a biased system on crime prevention and city regulations. 
Therefore, it was not the overall criminal offenses that had increased over decades of 
rural to urban migration, but the legal policy on detaining and controlling rural migrants 
emphasized by the Chinese government which led to more arrests and convictions. Lu 
and Drass (2002) studied the judiciary biases towards rural migrants and the relationship 
between crime and rural migration. Lu and Drass suggested that there were significant 
differences in pretrial detention and imprisonment of transients (migrants) and residents 
(pretrial detention involved 92% of the transients versus 62% of the local residents). In 
fact, transient populations had fewer administrative and criminal records than local 
offenders. Factors closely related to socioeconomic status determines the probability of 
pretrial detention and lengths of the imprisonment. Education, employment, and 
confession shortened the pretrial detention. However, the severity of the offense and legal
representation lengthened the detention. Lu and Drass suggested although rural status 
might directly affect sentencing outcomes, it indeed led to the intermediate decision-
pretrial detention.
Lu and Durass (2002) suggested the effect of migration in the Chinese context 
operates similarly with that of immigration in the West. Migration symbolized instability, 
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dislocation and lack of dependence, leading to a lack of informal social control and social
organization. The research also showed that rural migrants were more likely be convicted 
with serious criminal charges because they lacked appropriate identification to protect 
their status in terms of the rights of legal representation and legal compensation. Thus, as 
Lu and Drass recommended, legal reform should aim to reduce the arbitrariness and 
disparities in legal decisions and restore procedural justice for the defendants.
Rural to Urban Migration and Victimization
Literature indicated that rural migrants have their unique experiences as crime 
victims. Luo and Chen (2005) studied the psychology of rural migrant victims and their 
responses before, during, and after personal violence. They found that rural migrants 
were more likely to be involved with physical violence when they were lacking de-
escalation skills. Rural migrants who have higher level of fear and less social support and
coping skills were more likely to experience repeated victimization. Other than personal 
violence, rural migrants have become more likely to get involved with civil lawsuits. In 
2011, Binhai New District, one of the satellite cities of Tianjin, had a total 33,428 judicial
cases, of which the civil lawsuits against company or employers from the rural migrants 
were about 20% out of the total civil lawsuits.
Female and adolescent rural migrants were more likely to become victims of sex 
crimes. Liu (2012) studied the factors associated with female migrant workers’ 
involvement with prostitution. Childhood sexual abuse, previous partner abusive 
relationships, patriarchal family values, poverty, limited skills and education were strong 
predictors of female and adolescent prostitution. Liu and Frinkenauer (2010) studied 
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prostitution and sex trafficking since 1980s in China. In their research, findings showed 
increasing rates of sex crime corresponded to the growing number of rural migrant 
workers. Rural migrant workers who possess lesser skills and education were more likely 
to get involved with the sex industry. In addition, female migrant workers who engaged 
in sex industries were more likely to become the victims of human/sex trafficking. Chan 
(2009) confirmed the prevalence of the victimization among female migrant workers. He 
found that approximately 8% of women in rural areas had experienced sexual abuse 
before their migration, considerably higher than the 2.8% reported by women in cities. 
Chan also found that the lack of legal and social support for victims made it difficult for 
victims to disclose victimization. Depending on the local policies, non-urban hukou status
might prevent rural migrants from being able to appeal effectively for their rights and 
interests, and hence, to effectively safeguard their rights in social and legal realms. With a
rural hukou, rural migrants were not only ineligible for any social service and protections 
available in cities, but also were subject to being bullied and arrested by the local law 
enforcement. All of these experiences might prevent them from pursuing further legal 
protection. According to Lu and Song (2006), victimization negatively affects migrants’ 
assessment of their quality of life in the urban city. In their study, about 20% of migrant 
respondents in Lu and Song’s research stated that they had been victims of crime in the 
past, and the most frequent criminal victimization was fraud. Therefore, adequate public 
safety protections afforded to migrants are extremely important in reducing victimization.
Cheung (2013) explored the relationship between victimization, local and trans-
local ties, and mental health of the rural adolescent migrants. Cheung found that migrant 
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adolescents encountered more victimization than their urban native counterparts. In 
addition, victimization was the strongest predictor of poor psychological health among 
migrant adolescents. Cheung suggested that to maintain trans-local friendship ties was 
important for migrant adolescents. It indicated that the migrant respondents who 
experienced a high level of victimization but had more local ties with teachers/friends and
more trans-local ties with relatives/friends had a higher level of psychological wellbeing, 
when other variables were controlled.
Rural to Urban Migration and Fear of Crime
The relationship between immigration and fear of crime has been extensively 
studied in many developed countries. Studies have demonstrated how social 
disadvantages and community context might translate to a perceived risk of disorder. 
Individuals who have a higher perception of disorder are more likely to have a higher 
level of fear of crime (Hur & Nasar, 2014; Lane & Meeker, 2004; Liu et al., 2009; 
Riccato, Russim, & Vieno, 2011; Sampson, 1994; 2012; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; 
Scarborough et al., 2010). Both Sampson (1994) and Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) 
suggested that neighborhoods with socioeconomically disadvantaged groups influenced 
the perceptions of neighborhood disorder for both neighborhood residents and 
nonresidents. These signs of disorder translated to a “weakened system of friendship, 
kinship, and acquaintanceship networks” (Sampson, 2012). Neighborhood disorders 
(“incivilities” such as abandoned storefronts, graffiti and street panhandling) determined 
the degree of fear of crime because these factors indicated weakened traditional norms 
and local social control. These perceptions, in turn, were associated with fear of crime 
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(fear of being a victim of crime). Riccato et al. (2011) conducted a survey in Italy and 
found that both direct victimization and perceived disorder of community predicted a 
higher level of fear of crime. When the perceived disorder decreases, the level of fear of 
crime also decreased.
Scarborough et al. (2010) also confirmed the positive relation between perception 
of community disorder and fear of crime after personal characteristics (e.g. gender, age, 
race, and education) were controlled. Other studies showed that minority communities 
might have a higher level of fear due to their socioeconomic status and lack access to 
social supports and resources (Lane & Meeker, 2004). Gender was another powerful 
predictor of fear of crime. Women tended to express substantially higher levels of fear 
(Bennett & Flavin, 1994; Donnelly, 1989; McGarrell et al., 1997). Empirical research 
associating victimization with fear of crime has produced mixed results. Some studies 
found victimization experiences exerted little influence on fear of crime (Donnelly,1989; 
McGarrell et al., 1997) because of individual varied ways of coping with these 
victimization experiences, while others found such an association because of post-
traumatic effects (e.g., Bennett & Flavin,1994).
Hunter et al. (2009) pointed out the degree of fear of crime might relate to length 
of stay after migration among long-term residents, boom migrants, and post-boom 
migrants in boomtowns. Their research found that boom migrants expressed greater fear 
of crime than longer-term residents or post-boom migrants. These boom migrants lacked 
the social connection and informal social control in the residing areas. Overall, whether 
there was a relationship between perceived risk of victimization and being a rural migrant
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closely related to personal and environmental contexts. People who lack social 
connection and support, and stay in a disorganized neighborhood, are more likely to 
perceive a higher risk of victimization.
The relation between perceived disorder and victimization has also been 
empirically studied in post-reform China. Chinese rural migrants have an overall 
moderate level of fear of crime. The frequency of police contact has had a positive effect 
on fear of crime. The more frequent the contact with the police, the more positive 
attitudes the rural migrants are likely to have to them, and, in turn, there is less reported 
fear of crime (Lu & Song, 2006). Liu et al. (2009) also conducted research to measure the
relationship between perceived disorder of a neighborhood and fear of crime in China. 
Their study added social change as a variable into their equations and found that social 
change might alter the traditional belief on the relation between perceived social disorder 
and fear of crime. They found that the young and well-educated were more likely to 
associate community disorder with crime. In contradiction to findings in Western 
literature, Zhuo et al. (2008) found that none of the neighborhood structural factors–
poverty, residential instability and rural migrant concentration–yielded any significant 
effect on burglary risk. Zhuo and colleagues explained that rural migrants tended to live 
in factory dorms where they were less likely to be the target of property crimes. However,
Zhuo and colleagues proposed that rural migrants were more likely to become victims of 
physical violence, and the perpetrators were likely to be other rural migrants.
79
Other Indications Between Crime and Migration
Most studies on immigration (migration) and crime in the United States 
emphasized a structural level analysis. Immigrants have various difficulties in terms of 
sociological, economical, and psychological aspects of their experiences. It inevitably 
created barriers to achieve good quality of life. In addition, lack of local connection and 
social support also created greater challenges when they were trying to locate resources.
In China, studies focused on rural migration and crime, also highlighted similar 
structural barriers for rural migrants’ integration into local communities and presented 
unique findings. Rural migrants were overrepresented as criminal offenders in China 
during the last decades, especially in those major rural migrant receiving cities. In terms 
of types of offenses, they also tend to commit property and personal offenses. Age and 
gender play significant roles in predicting criminal behavior. For rural migrants, they tend
to have lower educational background and lack of legal cognition. Financial situations, 
such as poverty, make them find alternatives, often leading to crimes that subsidize their 
expensive city living. Delayed monthly payments created tensions between rural migrants
and their employers. For instance, in China, there are various incidents where rural 
migrants committed crimes against their employers due to either delayed payment or 
unfair treatments (Han & Yu, 2008; Huang, 2010).
Research also found that criminal activities as life alternatives help migrants to 
seek excitement and self-efficacy (Chang & Li, 2014). Rural migrants also tend to 
commit crimes against the person due to disputes or conflicts with people they know. In 
addition, rural migrants tend to become co-defendant with other criminal-prone 
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individuals or groups. For instance, some crime incidents showed that due to rural 
migrants having fewer local ties and closer friends in their destination cities, they were 
more likely to get involved with individual or groups that were likely to take advantage of
them, and lured them to committing crime. Rural migrants tended to move often and their
“mobile” status became an opportunity to commit crime. Rural migrants’ temporary 
status makes them easier to get away with crime due to lack of their local registration 
information. It also increases the difficulties of criminal investigation. Lastly, other than 
focusing on the criminal behavior and characteristics of the rural migrants, literature also 
presents the legal response of the criminal justice system in China toward migrants. The 






The researcher primarily uses “China Judgments Online”, a nation-wide database 
that was established pursuant to a series of Supreme Court rulings since 2000 in response 
to the lack of transparency, quality, and public access to judicial decision/procedures16. In 
2010, the Supreme Court17 mandated all lower courts should upload their judicial 
decisions into a nationwide database. On July 1, 2013, the China judgment Online 
website first went live. In November, 2013, the database became a unified online addition
to each court’s own database. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that upper level courts 
are responsible for supervising their direct lower courts in maintaining and updating the 
national database. Judges should designate and supervise a special unit that would be 
responsible for preparing and uploading cases within seven days (2015). Already 
published cases can only be removed with a Judge’s written report and the approval of an 
upper level court. By the end of 11/1/2015, there were 11,650,000 judicial decisions 
accessible and available online (Supreme Court, 2016).
The online database provides the only large scale and publicly available 
information regarding crime and punishment in China. It allows the current researcher to 
16 At the time, there were three major ways to access judicial documents. First and foremost, according to
the 2000 Supreme Court of PRC decision, high profile cases (e.g. Corruption of the Government 
Officials) can be found in two major legal journals —“People’s Daily” and “Legal’s Daily”. Secondly, 
judicial decisions made by higher courts can be used as precedents and should be published at People’s 
Courts Newspaper. Thirdly, all judicial decisions available should be accessible to the public through 
documented court records or internet databases. At this phase, all courts were only recommended but 
not required to do so.
17 Issues relate to Courts and online access of judicial decisions (Supreme Court , 2010)
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examine information pertinent to the characteristics of defendants, including, but not 
limited to, age, gender, migrant status, socioeconomic background, education, criminal 
record, alleged offense, offense of conviction, and legal representation. In addition, the 
database allows the researcher to arrange cases by year, location, criminal offense, and 
level of court from 2000 to 2016.
Completeness of the Online Database
Before examining the completeness of the online database, a few concerns should 
be addressed. First, a time lag exists between the day a judicial decision is made and its 
online publication. This time lag can vary from 20 days to several months. As a result, 
recently decided cases do not appear in the dataset. In addition, cases which will go to 
appellate courts are not posted until the appellate trial decisions have been made. Lack of 
information on all judicial decisions from courts of original jurisdiction impairs our 
understanding of judicial procedures.
Delays in uploading cases also appeared for the first couple of years after the 
establishment of the database. Although all levels of courts in China had begun to upload 
their judicial decisions to the database by the end of 2013 (Zhou, 2015); the uploading of 
a large volume of cases did not start until February, 2014. From January to August, 2012, 
214,098 criminal cases were available online (Supreme Court, 2015). By the end of 
August 14th, 2014, there were 791,475 judicial decisions in criminal cases available 
online, as the researcher noted.
In addition to the time lag, certain cases are exempted from online publication. 
Commonly occurring cases that the Supreme Court has said should not be published 
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include, cases related to National Intelligence, personal privacy18, juvenile offenders, and 
cases under Mediation (Supreme Court, 2015)19. Other cases that are exempt from 
publication include those that would involve information that might affect other cases. 
Finally, the Supreme Court allows parties to petition for the removal of a case that they 
feel was inappropriately published in violation of the exceptions. In addition to the 
incompleteness of the database, there is some redundancy. Under certain circumstances, 
both the initial and the appellate decision for the same case exist in the database.
Despite the various concerns mentioned above, the total number of online judicial 
decisions has increased significantly after the establishment of the online database. In 
2013, there were 1,707,773 judicial decisions available online (Zhou, 2015), which was 
only 13.18% of the total judicial decisions made in that year (according to the Annual 
Report of the Supreme Court, 12,956,716 judicial decisions, both criminal and civil, were
made in 2013). However, in 2014, 5,110,880 criminal and civil decisions were published 
online, 37.02% of the total judicial decisions (13,806,882) made in that year (Zhou, 
2016). Zhong et al, (2013) assessed the performance of the courts in publishing their 
cases online by city. Results are listed below:
Examining Table 1, it can be seen that many cities significantly improved their 
percentage of online cases. It is also noteworthy that cities that receive a large number of 
migrants (Tianjin, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai) have dramatically increased their 
18 According to the provisions published by the Supreme Court of P.R. China, information that is 
considered private includes: 1) Citizen’s name, image, home address and contact; 2) any personal 
background statement that the person does not consent to publish, with the exception of cases related to
business, tax and corruption issues where financial statements might be important evidence; 3) family 
members’ information; 4) other private information not related to the charges and judicial decisions.
19 According to the 2015 Supreme Court provision, the Supreme Court of People’s Republic of China’s 
decisions on all People’s Court should publish their judicial decisions online (2015).
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online case availability. Comparing 2014 to 2013, Beijing had a 354.56% increase; 
Shanghai increased its online case availability by 23.63%; Tianjin increased its online 
cases by 1035.28%; Guangzhou had a 237.76% increase. Among migrant receiving cities,
Tianjin and Guangdong stood out as having the highest percentage of published online 
cases with 34.07% and 30.66% respectively.
Online Total Percentage
2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014
Zhejiang 241742 380303 1076000 1119000 22.47 33.99
Shandong 109669 413306 981700 1033000 11.17 40.01
Jiangsu 103660 496570 1063965 1165234 9.74 42.62
Beijing 20376 92621 404022 448246 5.04 20.66
Guangdong 91615 336113 1003900 1096100 9.13 30.66
Shanghai 127283 157355 475400 545000 26.77 28.87
Fujian 26158 291559 537761 537949 4.86 54.20
Anhui 43159 276014 463970 541210 9.30 51.00
`Hebei 80377 266089 534050 491975 15.05 54.09
Tianjin 6540 74247 206436 217955 3.17 34.07
Table 1: Judicial Decision Online by City
The China Census and its Definitional Changes
Another important dataset in the current research is the 2015 China Census. The 
China Census allows the measurement of dynamics in population, as well as economic 
and social life for the entire nation. However, it is very important to address definitional 
changes of “rural”, “urban”, and “migrant” population that took place across waves of the
Census. These definitions directly influence the quality of the current research.
One thing that could happen in the China Census is that a rural migrant can be 
counted as urban. Under the 1982 Census, the urban population is defined as those who 
had lived for one year or more in a city, or those who had resided within the official 
boundary of a city or town for less than one year but had been absent from their place of 
hukou registration for one year or more. Therefore, all people with urban hukou plus 
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those with rural hukou but living within an urban boundary for one year or more will be 
considered urban. Therefore, it is very important to note that the urban population 
includes not only people with urban hukou but also people with rural hukou staying in a 
city for a longer period of time.
The definition of “migrant population” has also changed over time and it 
significantly changed the way rural migrants have been counted. In the 2000 Census, 
survey officials recorded migrants at their “usual residence”. In other words, individuals 
who were away from their hukou place for more than 6 months would be recorded at 
their physical location, and migrants who had been away for less than 6 months would be 
recorded at the location of their hukou (Chan, 2003). This physical location orientated 
numeration mechanism was likely to underestimate the total number of rural migrants.
However, in the 2005 Census, residents of each household were defined as 
“current resident plus absent resident”. At the hukou origin, family members were 
instructed to list all individuals who had their hukou registration linked to the household 
but were currently residing elsewhere. At the destination, individuals filled out the 
standard census questionnaire and reported their hukou of origin if it was different from 
their place of residence. This enumerating mechanism greatly improved the accuracy of 
the population count, although limitations still existed. For instance, enumerators were 
more likely to miss migrants residing in work sites and ungated neighborhoods. 
Additionally, some “illegal” migrants might try to avoid meeting with enumerators.
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Guangdong as the Sample Province
Guangdong is a China’s largest migrant receiving province. Li and Zahniser 
(2002) found that Guangdong had the highest rates of migration in the 1995 Chinese 
Household Income Project (CHIP--1995). In 2000, the total population of Guangdong at 
the time of the census was 86,420,000, of which the migrant population was 15,060,000. 
This represented 17.4% of the population in the entire Guangdong province (Census, 
2000)20. In Guangdong, the migrant population also has increased quickly within recent 
decades. In 2005, Guangdong’s population was 91,940,000; by the end of 2009, the 
population had increased to 96,380,000; by the end of 2013, the population was 
106,440,000 (Guangdong Census, 2005-2014). Between 2009 and 2013, the number of 
local rural migrants increased from 7,900,000 to 10,480,000 with an average of 645,000 
more migrants in each year (Guangdong Population and Society Institution, 2014; China 
Economic and Business Daily, 2015). In 2012, the population coming from outside (rural 
to urban and urban to urban population) of Guangdong province was as high as 77% of 
the entire province.
In addition to its prominence as a receiving province for migrants, Guangzhou is 
the only city of the four major migrant receiving cities (Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou) that established a policy regarding online judicial transparency one year 
prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court’s online database (Liang & Lu, 2006). He
and Wen (2014) praised the transparency of all levels of courts in Guangzhou and 
published a report titled “Guangdong is continuing to establish the most transparent and 
comprehensive online judicial decision platform” (2014). As the report states, in order to 
20 The 5th China Population Census (2000)
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enforce the transparency and efficiency of the publication of judicial decisions, the 
Guangzhou Superior Court ruled that all levels of courts in city of Guangzhou shall make 
their judicial decisions available online for public access within 7 days (with certain 
exceptions). Guangdong Superior Court also set up a mechanism to review and evaluate 
how each court in Guangzhou enforced the ruling. According to the same report, in 
October 2013, Guangdong ruled that each court shall upload judicial decisions online; by 
the end of March, 2014, 241,300 copies of judicial decisions (criminal, civil, and special 
court decisions) were available online.
The author also cursorily examined the quality of the judicial decisions from these
major rural migration receiving cities in addition to the available literature. By looking at 
the criminal cases tried by all levels of People’s Court in 2015 from these 
provincial/capital cities, the author made the following conclusions:
1. Guangdong has the highest number of criminal cases 
available online. Specifically, Guangdong has 69,879 cases 
available online; Shanghai has 19,696 cases available 
online; Tianjin has 9,291 cases available online; Beijing has
10,277 cases available online.
2. The judicial decisions made in Guangdong are 
comprehensive and informative compared to the other 
provinces. Out of the variables pertinent to the current 
research, Guangdong has all the information that the author
could use to operationalize important variables, such as 
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gender, migrants’ status, types of crime, and criminal intent.
In addition, the author also compared the informational 
content of cases in terms of criminal investigation 
procedures, interrogation, legal search, and eyewitness 
testimony. Guangdong province has well written and 
complete records for all these key variables.
In Guangdong province, there are two vice-provincial cities (Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen), 19 prefecture-level city courts, 33 county-level city courts, and 3 autonomous 
county courts, as well as the High People’s Court of Guangdong and the Patent Special 
Court of Guangdong. As of April 27th, 2016, the available online criminal judicial 
decisions in Guangdong provinces included a total of 1,643,313 cases from 2006 to 2014.
In 2014, 111,489 criminal judicial decisions were available in the online database. Among
these, 72,594 were from the first trial, 7,825 cases were from a first appellate court 
appearance, and 59 judicial decisions were from a second appellate court appearance.
Research Questions
As previously discussed, a great deal of literature has found a relationship 
between crime and rural migration in China. However, many of these studies have 
utilized data sets that are not open to public access. The results of these studies are 
therefore incapable of replication and confirmation. The current study will use the online 
judicial decisions dataset which is the first publicly available individual level dataset on 
crime and criminals in China. As described earlier, the dataset provides rich information 
on characteristics of offenders, including migration status, employment, age, sex, charged
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offense, and characteristics of the judicial proceedings. It allowed the researcher not only 
to examine the relation between rural to urban migration and appearance in court records,
but also to offer theoretical analysis, and recommendations for future research. The 
following questions will be explored in the current study:
Question 1: How do rural migrants differ from the rest of the 
sample in terms of personal characteristics?
Question 2: Are rural migrants disproportionately represented 
in the publicly available criminal courts records for the 
sample province in 2015?
Question 3: Are rural migrants more likely to commit violent 
offenses for the sample province in 2015?
Question 4: Are rural migrants more likely to receive a harsher 
sentence in the current study?
Sample
The current sample is drawn from the China judgments online database. The 
sampling frame is the published criminal judicial decisions made in 2015 by the 
Intermediate Court of Guangdong Province. The reason for choosing the Intermediate 
Court is because the researcher is interested in relatively common, yet serious, criminal 
offenses. The Intermediate Court is where such cases are most likely to be found, since 
the Basic Court tends to deal with minor cases, and the High Court, while dealing with 
serious cases, only sees very rare cases as a court of original jurisdiction (e.g. 
governmental corruption).
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For 2015, there were a total of 23,801 cases published online for the Intermediate 
Court of Guangdong province. A systematic sampling procedure was used, incorporating 
a power analysis with a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5. A sample 
size of 378 was suggested.
In order to produce the current sample, the researcher arranged the judicial 
decisions in 2015 from the newest to oldest (the website itself provides this function), to 
which the researcher appended a case number from 1 to 23,801. Using the total 
population size 23,801 divided by 378 cases, the result is around 63. Therefore, the 
researcher selected every 63rd case to create the current sample. The final sample ended 
up consisting of 378 cases.
Title of the Case (Number of the case) 
 (Name)_________Offense___________Number of the trial  
            The name of the Court  
           (Original jurisdiction of the case) 
Paragraph 1: Name_____, from______, hukou status, current migrant or 
resident status at the time of the offense, gender, age, employment status at the 
time of offense, prior criminal offenses, and current placement; 
Paragraph 2: The narrative of the offense: Time_____, place_______, any co-
defendants, defendant’s recorded state of mind, consequences of the criminal 
conduct, information about any victim(s); 
Paragraph 3: Charges; 
Paragraph 4: Narrative describing the criminal investigation; 
Paragraph 5: Statement from the criminal defendant attorney, victim statement, 
and mitigating circumstances; 
Paragraph 6: Court’s decisions, any sentence; 
Paragraph 7: Notes on criminal appeal procedure; 
Signature of the person who wrote the document 
Date of preparation of the current document 
Figure 3: Case Brief Template
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Variables
In order to identify what variables are available for analysis, a random selection of
10 judicial decisions from the Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong province in 
2015 were selected and examined. The typical organizational structure of a judicial case 
appears below:
While the majority of the cases conformed to the above structure, it is important 
to note that some cases deviated from this organizational structure. For instance, there 
were some cases that had more than one paragraph to describe the criminal incident.
By examining the narrative information of the case file, variables of interest to the
relationship between crime and migration can be extracted. Each case in the sample was 
examined, with the information relevant to the current study’s variables coded according 
to the following scheme.
Information on Crime
Time of day. Each case provided a brief description of when the criminal offense 
occurred. However, due to the potential chronological complexities of criminal events, 
the time of offense was narrowed down to two categories: time of the day (AM, PM). 
Therefore, the variable was measured as categorical and was coded as Daytime = 0; 
Nighttime = 1.
Ongoing criminal enterprise. In the Judicial Online Dataset, some offenses had 
taken place as a singular incident while other offenses had taken place over a longer 
period of time. As a result, the author coded this type of offense as follow: continuing 
offense = 0; singular incident = 1.
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Types of Criminal offenses. There is no difference between the crime that is 
charged and the crime of conviction in the online judicial database. Offenses were coded 
as a categorical variable. Each offense category was coded as follows: 1 = 
homicide/manslaughter; 2 = aggravated assault; 3 = rape; 4 = sex trafficking (e.g. alluring
adolescents to engage in the sex industry, selling women and/or young children into sex 
trade); 5 = abduction; 6 = robbery; 7 = occupational crime (e.g. embezzlement, 
corruption, public officials receiving money in exchange for favors); 8 = drug offenses; 9 
= endangering public safety (e.g. gang related crimes, public fights involving more than 3
people and resulting in extreme public disturbance); 10 = interrupting law enforcement 
(various behaviors that aim to interrupt law enforcement investigation and arrest); 11 = 
fraud; 12 = theft (larceny and burglary); 13 = copyright violations; 14 = firearm crimes 
(possession and/or selling of firearms); 15 = illegal business (e.g. business that was 
prohibited by law, such as, prostitution, gambling, and cannabis shop). For analytical 
purposes, the author also recoded the “types of offense” variable into a number of 
different categorical variables. The first recode created a new “crimes against the person”
variable with homicide, aggravated assault, rape, sex trafficking, abduction, and robbery 
coded 1, and all other offenses coded 0. Then a “crimes against property” variable was 
created that recoded fraud, theft and copyright violations as 1, and all other offenses 
coded 0.
Co-defendant. Each case also provided information on whether the defendant had
co-defendant(s). Therefore, the co-defendant variable was coded as a dummy variable 
with no co-defendants = 0, and the presence of one or more co-defendants = 1.
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Characteristics of criminal defendants
 Age. The Online Judicial Database includes each defendant’s age at the time of 
the offense, and will be coded as a continuous variable.
Ethnicity. In the People’s Republic of China, there are 56 governmentally 
recognized ethnicities. Among them, “Han” is identified as the majority ethnicity. The 
remaining 55 ethnicities are identified as minorities. As a result, the ethnicity of offenders
is coded as a dichotomous variable where minority = 1 and majority = 0.
Gender. Gender was coded as male = 1 and female = 0.
Educational background. The Online Judicial Dataset includes the educational 
background of defendants. It was coded as an ordinal level variable with illiterate = 0; 
primary school = 1; middle school = 2; high school = 3; undergraduate degree and above 
= 4.
Hukou status. As previously discussed, in China there are three types of hukou: 
rural, urban and rural-urban converts. Therefore, this variable was coded as urban = 0; 
rural = 1; and rural to urban convert = 2.
Migrant status. The Online Judicial Dataset specified the hukou status of each 
defendant. Those who had migrated from rural areas are considered rural migrants. Those
who grew up in urban areas are considered urban. The typical way of delivering this 
information is starting out with the name of the defendant, followed by their hukou status 
and if they were rural migrants (there will be a status called “ ” 农民工 (rural migrants) 
immediately following the hukou status). Therefore, rural migrant status was coded by 
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whether, at the time of the offense, the defendant was a rural migrant or not. The variable 
was coded as rural = 1 and urban = 0.
Employment status at the time of the offense. Occupation was coded as a 
categorical variable with the following categories: unemployed = 1; construction worker 
= 2; factory worker = 3; day laborer = 4; non-governmental white collar worker = 5; 
governmental official = 6; and farmer = 7.
Prior sentences involving incarceration. The Online Judicial Dataset provided 
information on the prior criminal convictions for each defendant that involved 
incarceration. For those defendants who had any previous convictions, the researcher 
coded it = 1 and for those defendants who had no previous conviction, the researcher 
coded it = 0.
Defendant’s recorded state of mind. Criminal intention is included in the 
narrative in each case. Based on Gao (2011) and the Guangzhou Inferior Court, common 
criminal motivations include anger, jealousy, feelings of being mistreated, being under 
pressure for money, curiosity, a sense of brotherhood and revenge. Based off of 
unsystematic observations while reading the case summaries, the author believes that the 
sample cases were following the same pattern. Therefore, recorded criminal intention has 
been coded using the following five categories: greed (贪图金钱利益）= 1; anger = 2; 
excitement and curiosity = 3; jealousy = 4; revenge = 5; under pressure for money（图财
心切）= 6.
Sentence. Sentence was coded as an interval level variable. In the narrative for 
each case, the fixed year sentences to prison are stated in years and months. For ease of 
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analysis, the author transformed each fixed year sentence from year and month to the 
equivalent of months. In addition, life sentences have been coded as 888 and the death 
penalty has been coded as 889.
Conviction. This variable was originally coded as guilty = 1 and not guilty = 0. In
the later analysis, the variable was excluded from analysis since all offenders in the 
current sample were convicted of a crime.
Characteristics of Victims
Victim-offender relationship. Each court case describes whether the defendant 
knew the victim(s). As discussed earlier, there are exceptions to the disclosure of possible
relationships between victims and offenders (e.g. if the disclosure might have harmful 
consequences for victims), in which case this information is subject to removal by the 
court. Thus, the researcher cannot collect information on all cases. Nonetheless, where 
the information was available, victim-offender relationship is coded as a dichotomous 
variable with 0 = the victim and offender did not know each other prior to the offense, 




This chapter includes a presentation of research findings from the current study. 
First, offenders’ characteristics for the current sample are provided. Second, the 
researcher compares the descriptive statistics for the current study with the extant 
literature on rural migrants and crime to examine whether there are any similarities or 
differences. Finally, a restatement of the research questions and the results for each 
question are presented.
Preliminary Analysis: Quality Assurance
Prior to any statistical analyses, a Chinese native checked a random sample of 37 
(10%) cases for accuracy of the author’s coding. One mistake21 and two discrepancies22 
were found. The author then randomly selected every tenth case of the entire sample to 
match with the original narrative data source. Each narrative element and corresponding 
coding was reviewed to ensure they were free of error.
Univariate analyses. Table 2 presents characteristics of the offenders in the 
current sample data. It includes fifteen variables23 in the current study—ethnicity, migrant
status, gender, time of the offense, ongoing vs. singular offense, hukou registration, type 
21 Date of birth of one of the offenders.
22 The first discrepancy is related to the recoding of types of offense, regarding whether illegal business is
property crime or other. The researcher decided the illegal business will be categorized as other type of 
crime. The second discrepancy is whether a crime that is originally stated as motorcycle drag and steal 
was robbery or theft. The research confirmed it as robbery.
23 The “conviction” variable was excluded from analysis since all offenders in the current sample were 
convicted of a crime. In addition, whether the case was original or appellant has also been excluded due
to the inconsistency of the information and possible missing data.
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of offense, age of the defendant, state of mind, educational background, occupation, 
offender-victim relationship, co-defendant, prior conviction, and sentence.
In the current sample, as shown in Table 2, criminal defendants are 
overwhelmingly of China’s majority (Han) ethnicity (90.2%). Rural migrants are 
disproportionally represented in the current sample (62.4%) compared to urban offenders 
(37.6%). The hukou registration variable is consistent with the migrant status variable; 
61.4% of the sample population has a rural hukou, with an additional four people (1.1%) 
being hukou converters. The vast majority of the sample population (95.5%) is male. 
Among all crimes, the majority of offenses (66.1%) were committed at night. Singular 
offenses, as opposed to ongoing criminal enterprises, are the most frequently occurring 
(75.4%). The most common age for the sample (44.4%) is between 26 and 35 years of 
age; this might indicate that those tried as an adult for more serious crimes in the 
Intermediate Courts in Guangdong province are typically older. Among the sample, the 
majority (53.2%) are unemployed, and 11.9% are day laborers, which shows that most of 
the defendants in the current sample have no steady employment at the time of the 
offense. Regarding educational background, defendants in the current sample are most 
likely to have a middle school or lower education.
Regarding types of offenses, the most frequently occurring crime is aggravated 
assault (24.9%). The second most frequently occurring offense is robbery (16.4%). 
Following robbery, theft (11.6%) is the third most frequently occurring offense. 
Homicide/Manslaughter (11.4%) is the fourth most common offense committed by the 
current sample. When examining state of mind attributed to offenders, greed and pressure
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for money were reported as the most common motivations for criminal offenses with 
25.9% and 23.3%, respectively. Nearly half of the offenders reportedly knew their victims
(48.9%). The majority of offenses (59%) were committed by one offender alone. In 
addition, the majority (64%) of the offenders had no prior criminal record. In terms of 
fixed term sentences, the average sentence for an offender is 111.41 months. The 
minimum fixed sentence for an individual was 8 months, and the maximum fixed term of 
imprisonment for a person was 240 months. There was a total of 50 offenders sentenced 
to life imprisonment and 35 offenders were sentenced to death.














































Table 2: Characteristics of the Offenders
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Descriptive of the Entire Sample
Type of Offense N %
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Bivariate analyses. A series of bivariate analyses were conducted to begin 
examining the relationships between migrant status and characteristics of the offenders. 
Statistical relationships between migrant status and some key variables are highlighted in 
the following descriptions. A Chi-square test of independence was used to examine how 
migrant status is correlated with characteristics of the offender that are categorical, such 
as hukou registration, gender, types of offenses, and employment status. A Spearman’s 
rho correlation was used to examine the relationship between migrant status and 
educational background.
First, there is a perfect positive relation between migrant status and hukou 
registration. In other words, hukou status and migrant status are ultimately measuring the 
same concept. Therefore, the researcher decided to only use the “migrant status” variable 
in future analysis. Second, there is a significant positive association between the “migrant
status” variable and the “type of criminal offense”24 variable, χ2 (2, N = 378) = 15.029, p 
< .001. This positive association reflects the coding scheme used in the current research, 
with rural migrant status coded as 1 and urban status coded as 0; while crimes against the
person was coded as 2, and other types of offenses was coded as 0. This positive 
association between “migrant status” variable and the “type of offense” variable shows 
that when an offender is a rural migrant, crimes that he or she committed are more likely 
to be crimes against the person. Other statistically significant correlations with migrant 
status are also found, including ongoing vs. singular offense χ2 (1, N = 378) = 15.690, p <
.001, and the victim-offender relationship χ2 (1, N = 378) = 14.663, p < .001.
24 Researcher recoded the types of criminal offenses into property, crimes against the person and other
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According to the dataset, the majority of the defendants were reported to have 
committed crimes while experiencing one of the following three types of mindsets: greed 
(25.9%), pressure for money (23.3%), or anger (19%). This researcher, therefore, is 
interested in exploring the relationship between migrant status and these descriptions. 
Therefore, the researcher recoded the variable state of mind into three new variables: 
“pressure for money”, “greed”, and “anger”. For “pressure for money”, the original 
variable state of mind was recoded into a dichotomous variable with pressure for money 
= 1 and others = 0. For “greed”, the original variable was recoded into another new 
dichotomous variable with greed = 1 and others = 0. For “anger”, a new dichotomous 
variable was created with anger = 1 and others = 0. Chi-square tests of independence 
were used to examine the relationship between migrant status and state of mind: pressure 
for money, greed, and anger respectively. None of these three new variables indicate 
significant correlation between migrant status.
A Spearman’s rho correlation was utilized to determine the relationship between 
migrant status and educational background. There was a strong, negative correlation 
between migrant status and educational background (which was statistically significant rs
(377) = -.293, p = .01). These findings indicate that when a defendant is a rural migrant, it
is less likely that he or she had received a higher education. Although there was a 
significant relationship among rural migrants, many urban offenders also had low levels 
of education. Specifically, an approximate 80% of urban defendants had an educational 
attainment at middle school level or below (comparable to approximately 92% of the 
rural migrants). Only 13.4% of the urban defendants had degrees at or above an 
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undergraduate degree level (compared to 1.3% of the rural migrants). This demonstrated 
that the majority of the urban defendants in the current study were just like their rural 
migrant defendant counterparts, who had a relatively low educational degree in the 
current dataset.
In conclusion, in the current dataset, rural migrant offenders were more likely to 
commit crimes against the person. They are more likely to have committed crimes 
against victims they knew; they more likely engaged in a singular criminal enterprise; 
and, they have lower levels of educational attainment than their urban counterparts.
In order to better demonstrate these correlational findings, the researcher presents 
case briefs that are consistent with these findings. All case briefs as they are presented 
here reflect the material that appears in the online narrative–the researcher is not 
vouching for the objective accuracy of the narratives, merely trying to provide a sense of 
the pictures they paint. The typical profile of a rural migrant offender in Guangdong 
province is a young man between the ages of 20 and 35, with relatively little education, 
and without employment at the time of the offense. Violent crimes are common, with 
most crimes likely to occur against someone the offender knew, and often escalating from
a simple argument. Jealousy and revenge are also the predominant reasons for violent 
crimes among rural migrant offenders. It is worth noting that these criminal behavior 
patterns, while typical, are not exhaustive of the offenses that rural migrants were charged
with in the current sample
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Selected Case Samples
Yu and Zhu aggravated assault appeal. In 2014, Yu and Zhu and a group of 
friends went to a club and had a confrontation with Qiao and Ya. Yu and Zhu intended 
revenge and asked some other friends to come over and scare Qiao and Ya. Qiao and Ya 
also called some friends and a group fight ensued. Qiao was stabbed and died at the 
scene; Ya was badly injured. The Forensic Lab reported that the victims had used heroin. 
According to the police report, both Yu’s and Qiao’s group were anonymously reported 
by local people as “trouble”. The local police department had verbally warned these two 
groups to stop showing up at the public place. According to an informant’s statement, Yu 
and Qiao were in conflict with each other’s group for a long time and both of them had 
planned for a fight. At the time of the offense, both Qiao and Yu were underemployed and
often hung out with a group of “fellow” friends at the night market.
Jia premeditated murder first trial. Jia and Zeng were both homeless and lived 
in the tunnel of a parking lot. One night, Zeng accused Jia of having stolen his mega 
electric devices charger, which was considered a trendy item at the time. Zeng confronted
Jia, and threatened him with a fruit knife. Jia was infuriated and told Zeng that if he kept 
doing this, he would fight back. Jia took Zeng’s knife and stabbed him ten times which 
resulted in Zeng dying at the crime scene.
Mao aggravated assault appellate court case. In this case, the accused, Mao, 
quarreled with a few friends while eating out at a night market. Mao was aggravated 
because he thought Zhou (the victim) and his group of friends were cheating at a poker 
game. Mao argued with Zhou and the two ended up fighting. Mao grabbed a fruit knife 
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on the side table and stabbed Zhou which resulted in Zhou’s injury. According to witness 
accounts, Mao indicated that Zhou was a coward and tended to play games to win. Other 
verbal insults involved an incriminating statement about how Zhou stole his boss’s 
property when he was a driver for a construction company, as well as commenting on his 
cheating girlfriend’s behavior. The witnesses believed that all of these verbal insults and 
physical confrontation aggravated the reported incident. 
Research Questions
Question 1: How do rural migrants and urban residents differ in their personal 
characteristics?
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample by migrant status. According 
to Table 3, both rural and urban offenders in the current sample are more likely to be male
and Chinese’s majority (Han) ethnicity. However, rural migrants have a higher proportion
of minority population than the urban residents of Guangdong province. Given the fact 
that most minorities in China typically reside in rural areas, the higher percentage of 
minorities as rural migrants (14.4% vs. 2.1%) should be expected. As seen in Table 3 
rural migrant offenders were more likely to commit crimes against the person. They are 
more likely to have committed crimes against victims they knew; they more likely 
engaged in a singular criminal enterprise; and, they were largely without a previous 
criminal history. In Table 3, it was shown that urban offenders were more likely to engage
an ongoing crime compared to rural offenders (35.9% vs. 17.8%), while rural migrants 
were more likely to engage in singular offenses compared to urban offenders (82.2% vs. 
64.1%). Another difference shown in Table 3 is that although there were more college 
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degrees among urban offenders, the majority of offenders in this study (both rural and 
urban) were unemployed and undereducated. 
With regard to state of mind, as previously discussed, there were no significant 
differences by migrant status for these states of mind. Nonetheless, some interesting 
trends do preset themselves. There are more urban offenders accused of committing 
crime because of greed, while more rural migrant offenders were accused of committing 
crime because of pressure for money. This finding indicates that offenders in the current 
sample committed crimes that are primarily economically driven, regardless of whether 
or not they are migrants. The motivations, however, were subtly This finding indicates 
that offenders in the current sample committed crimes that are primarily economically 
driven, regardless of whether they are migrants or not. The motivations, however, were 
subtly different, based on a sense of case briefs. Urban offenders seemed more likely to 
be reported as “greedy” as if they were insatiable, while rural offenders seemed more 
likely to be portrayed as “frustrated” because of a lack of money. As for occupation, 
compared to urban offenders, rural migrants, if they were regularly employed, worked 
primarily as farmers and construction workers. Urban offenders, on the other hand, had 
greater access to quality education and better job placement. Therefore, the proportion of 
urban offenders who held white collar jobs (15.5%) is greater than the percentage of rural
offenders who held white collar jobs (3.8%).
It must now be determined how the type of offenses that rural and urban offenders
commit differ. For example, rural migrants committed many more violent crimes while 
urban offenders committed many more occupational and illegal business offenses. In 
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many cases, rural migrants were more likely to occupy poorly paid and low social status 
positions at the time of the offense. These findings not only indicate differential 
opportunity structures between rural and urban offenders but also suggest that people 
who have no stable employment, lower education, and financial frustrations have a 
greater tendency to get involved with criminal offenses in the Guangdong sample.
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Descriptive of the Entire Sample Urban Rural
Ethnicity N % N %
Gender
Time committed crime
Ongoing vs. Singular Offense

























































































































































































Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample by Migrant Status-
Personal Characteristics
In addition, the average age of the offenders in the current sample is older when 
compared to the age-crime curve that is well-known in the criminological literature. More
specifically, the average age of the urban offenders is 35, and the average age of rural 
migrants is 31 (see Figure 4a and 4b).
Figure 4a: Age of the Defendants (Urban)
Figure 4b: Age of the Defendants (Rural)
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Overall, the majority of rural criminal defendants in the current study have low 
education and were unemployed at the time of the offense. For those rural migrants who 
were employed at the time of offense, they were less likely to have high-status positions; 
they were more likely to be farmers or construction workers. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, social inequality, social disorganization, and differential opportunities are all
important to understanding rural migration and crime in China.
A Comparison of the Characteristics of Rural Offenders in the Current Sample and 
other Literature on Rural Migrants and Crime in China.
When compared against the extant literature on rural migrant offenders in China, 
the current sample demonstrated some differences and similarities. In the current study, 
nearly half (48.7%) of the rural migrant defendants were between the ages of 26 and 35. 
Another study by Chang and Li (2014) using a national representative sample showed 
that rural migrant offenders are typically between 18 and 49 years of age. In contrast, 
some other studies, such as Jiang and Yang (2015)’s study on rural migrant offenders in 
Guangdong, found that the rural migrant offenders were predominantly younger than 26.
Regarding types of offenses, there are discrepancies between the current study 
and other migrant literature in terms of the ratio of crimes against the person and crimes 
against property. In the current study, more than half (64.8%) of the offenses that rural 
migrants committed were crimes against the person, including aggravated assault, 
robbery, homicide, sex trafficking, abduction, and rape. The rates of crimes against the 
person in the current study is much higher than other literature on migration and crime in 
China. For example, Chang and Li (2014) found that 25% of offenses were crimes 
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against the person. Jiang and Yang (2015) found 81% of rural migrant offenders in their 
sample committed property crimes, with 51.44% of property offenses involving physical 
coercion, such as robbery and motorcycle robbery. One cause of these discrepancies may 
due to variation in population frameworks. For example, the sample population Jiang and 
Yang studied in their study was drawn from all levels of courts in Guangdong province. 
In contrast, the sample population in the current study was drawn from the Intermediate 
level Court in Guangdong province. As a result, the characteristics of the sample 
populations should be expected to vary. Another cause for the discrepancies might be due 
to differences in the operationalization of “types of offense”. Notice in Jiang and Yang’s 
study, robbery was considered a property crime rather than crimes against the person. As 
Jiang and Yang mentioned in their research, the sole purpose for this categorization is to 
distinguish various criminal motivations. Therefore, if re-categorized, “property crimes 
with physical coercion” (51.44%), into “crimes against the person” (52.44% plus 25%, as
stated in Jiang and Yang’s study), it can be concluded that the current findings are similar 
to other literature.
Some similarities between the current study and the extant literature concern 
employment status and state of mind. Both the current study and other literature found 
that rural migrant offenders were commonly unemployed at the time of the offense. For 
example, in the current study, 53.4% of the rural migrant offenders were unemployed at 
the time of the offense. Other studies, such as Jiang and Yang’s (2015) study on migrant 
offenders, found that most of their rural migrant defendants had migrated to Guangzhou 
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without job placement, and this condition of unemployment had been ongoing for at least 
six months.
Regarding state of mind, both the current research and other literature (Jiang & 
Yang 2015) found the most prominent reasons for committing crime included pressure for
money, anger, and jealousy. For example, 49.1% of the rural migrant offenders in the 
current study committed offenses because of greed and pressure for money. Although 
government officials are the primary source for these statements, they nonetheless tells us
how the court views the motivation of the offenders.
Overall, the characteristics of the offenders in the current study are generally 
consistent with the available literature, although some discrepancy exists. As will be seen,
rural migrant offenders in the Intermediate Court of Guangdong province were younger 
than mid-30s, and they were more likely to commit crimes because of anger and jealousy.
In addition, rural migrant offenders were more likely to be unemployed at the time of the 
offense. Offenses were typically taking place during the nighttime, were violent in nature,
and were against someone the offender knew.
Question 2: Are rural migrants disproportionately represented in the publicly available 
criminal court records for the sample province in 2015?
Before proceeding to answer the research question, a clarification regarding how 
the China Judicial Online dataset defines rural migrants is crucial. As previously stated, 
the correlation between migrant status and hukou registration is significant at χ2 (1, N = 
378) = .991, p < .001. Therefore, the author concluded that in the current sample, a rural 
migrant is defined as an individual who has a rural hukou status at the time of the offense.
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However, as discussed in Chapter VI, China’s Census used a different enumeration 
mechanism to count the rural migrant population. According to the Census, an individual 
who possesses a rural hukou can be counted as “urban” once they have remained in the 
city for over a year.
According to the Guangdong Census 2016, the total population of rural migrants 
in Guangdong is approximately 26,000,000 out of a total population of 108,700,000. In 
the current sample there are 236 (62.4%) rural migrants and 142 (37.6%) urban offenders.
In other words, approximately two in three offenders in the current sample population is a
rural offender.
In the current study, rural migrants made up 64.2% of the defendant population, 
while constituting 23.9% of the general population. Therefore, it can concluded that the 
migrant population in the current sample is overrepresented compared to the total migrant
population in Guangdong province. However, this conclusion should be interpreted with 
caution because the definition of rural migrant differs between the Census and the current
dataset. In a sense, there is a high possibility that the Census of Guangdong might have 
underestimated rural migrant population in Guangdong province. Even though this might 
be the case, it is unlikely that rural migrants represented 64.2% of the people in 
Guangdong province in 2015. Therefore, the author is confident in concluding that in the 
current sample, rural migrants are disproportionally represented in the China Judicial 
Online dataset.
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Figure 5: Types of Offenses by Migrant Status
Question 3: Do rural migrants differ from the rest of the sample in terms of the offense 
they are charged with for the sample province in 2015?
Figure 5 provides information on all types of offenses between rural and non-rural
offenders. Examining Figure 5, it can be seen that rural migrants committed many more 
homicide/manslaughter offenses compared to urban offenders. Robbery, theft, and sex 
trafficking were also perpetrated by rural migrants at frequencies disproportionate to their
sample representation compared to urban offenders. Urban offenders, on the other hand, 
were more likely to be convicted of occupational crime, drug dealing, fraud, and illegal 
business offenses. Other types of offenses in the current dataset, such as copyright 
infringement, rape, possession of firearm, abduction, interrupting law enforcement, do 
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not indicate noticeable differences between rural and urban offenders. This may be due to
several reasons, including small numbers of each category.
Urban Rural
N % N %
Aggravated Assault 36 25.4 Aggravated Assault 58 24.6
Drug Dealing 18 12.7 Robbery 45 19.1
Robbery 17 12.0 Homicide/Manslaughter 34 14.4
Occupational Crime 15 10.6 Theft 31 13.1
Theft 13 9.2 Drug Dealing 23 9.7
Fraud 11 7.7 Endanger public safety 9 3.8
Illegal Business 9 6.3 Fraud 9 3.8
Homicide 9 6.3 Abduction 7 3.0
Endanger public safety 4 2.8 Illegal Business 6 2.5
Copyright 3 2.1 Sex trafficking 5 2.1
Rape 2 1.4 Rape 4 1.7
Possession of Firearm 2 1.4 Possession of firearm 2 0.8
Abduction 2 1.4 Interrupt Law enforcement 2 0.8
Interrupt Law enforcement 1 0.7 Occupation Crime 1 0.4
Sex Trafficking 0 0.0 Copyright 0 0.0
Table 4: Ranking Of All Types Of Crimes Committed By Rural And Urban Offenders
Corresponding to Figure 5, Table 4 presents a ranking of all types of crimes 
committed by both urban and rural offenders. By looking at the top 5 offenses committed 
by both rural and urban offenders, it can seen that rural and urban offenders vary in the 
types of offenses with which they are charged. The second most frequently occurring 
offense among urban offenders is drug dealing, while it is robbery for the rural migrant 
population. Urban offenders committed far more occupational crime, which is ranked as 
fourth among their group. Once again, our findings confirmed that there are differences 
regarding crime patterns between rural and urban offenders. Rural migrants were more 
likely to be convicted of “street crimes”, such as robbery, murder, and aggravated assault.
However, urban offenders were more likely to be ranked higher for their conviction of 
“white collar” crime, such as occupational crimes, fraud, and illegal business.
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This study also collapsed various types of offenses into a broader classification 
scheme. The three categories here are crimes against the person25, crimes against 
property26, and other crimes27. This analysis was used as a tool to examine certain 
theoretical assumptions regarding an individual’s tendency to commit a violent or a 
property offense. As shown in Table 5, in the current sample, rural migrants have 
committed many more violent crimes relative to their overall number of crimes than their 
urban counterparts (64.8% versus 46.5%). Urban offenders, however, committed other 
types of offenses, such as illegal business and occupational crimes, at higher levels 
relative to their overall number of crimes. These findings indicate a pattern of differential 
opportunities between rural and urban offenders, which the author will discuss in detail in
a later section.
Urban Rural
N % N %
Crimes Against Property 27 19.0 40 17.0
Crimes Against the Person 66 46.5 153 64.8
Other 49 34.5 43 18.2
Total 142 100.0 236 100.0
Table 5: Type of Offense by Migrant Status
Since the findings show that rural migrants were accused of committing many 
more crimes against the person, the author would like to further examine what factors 
better predict the probability that an offender will commit crimes against the person by 
utilizing a logistic regression model. The model contained 11 independent variables 
(ethnicity, gender, offense time, migrant status, state of mind, education, age, 
employment status, victim-offender relationship). The dependent variable “type of 
25 Homicide, aggravated assault, rape, sex trafficking, abduction, robbery.
26 Fraud, copyright, and theft.
27 Occupational crime, drug dealing, endanger public safety, interrupt law enforcement, possession of 
firearms, and illegal business.
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offense” was recoded into a new dichotomous variable with “crimes against the person” 
= 1 and “all other types of crime” = 0. The state of mind variable was recoded as a new 
dichotomous variable with anger triggered offenses =1 and non-anger triggered 
offenses=0. So in fact, the state of mind variable really measures whether anger is the 
purported state of mind that triggered the offense or whether some other state of mind 
triggered the offense. Education was recoded into a new dichotomous variable measuring 
whether offenders either had middle school or lower education, or whether they have 
education above the middle school level. The categories illiterate, primary school, and 
middle school are coded as 1; a high school education or above is coded as 0. The 
occupation variable, which really measures employment status, was also recoded as a 
dichotomous variable with unemployed = 1 and other occupations = 0. Victim-offender 
relationship was recoded with two categories: known to victim = 1 and others (unknown 
or victimless) = 0. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 
(11, N = 378) = 146.189, p < .001 indicating that the model was able to distinguish 
between an offender who has or has not committed crimes against the person in the 
current sample.
As shown in Table 6, four independent variables made a unique, statistically 
significant contribution to the model (gender, migrant status, state of mind – with scale 
towards anger, and victim-offender relationship). This result indicated that when a 
offender is male, the likelihood of committing crimes against the person increases 4.473 
times. Migrant status is another strong predictor for crimes against the person. When an 
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offender is a rural migrant, the likelihood that the individual will commit crimes against 
the person increases 1.899 times.
Whether a defendant was angry while committing a crime is a stronger predictor 
for this type of offense. Specifically, being angry increases the likelihood of committing 
crimes against the person by 4.639 times, after controlling other factors in the model. The
strongest predictor for whether offenders were charged with crimes against the person 
was whether they knew their victim, according an odds ratio of 6.639. This indicated that 
by knowing the victim, the likelihood of the offender committed crimes against the 
person increased approximately 7 times, after controlling for other factors in the model.
In the current study, rural migrants differ from the rest of the sample when 
considering the types of offenses with which they are charged. Rural migrants are 
overrepresented in crimes against the person offenses in the current study. These are 
typical street crimes as identified in the criminological literature. In contrast, urban 
offenders are more likely to be arrested and convicted of corruption, drug dealing, fraud, 
and illegal business, most of which are typically referred to as “white collar” crimes. This
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Independent Variables b Odds Ratio
Ethnicity 0.073 1.076
Gender 1.498 4.473 *
Time Committed Crime -0.188 0.828
Migrant Status 0.641 1.899 *
State of Mind (Anger/Other than Anger) 1.535 4.639 **
Age -0.027 0.974
Education (Below High School/At or Above High School) 0.032 1.032
Employment (Unemployed/Employed) -0.544 0.580
Victim-Offender Relationship (Known/Unknown to Victim) 1.893 6.639 **
Co-Defendant -0.848 0.428
Prior Conviction -0.240 0.786
Constant -0.752 0.471
Table 6: Logistic Regression of Variables on Violent Offense with control 
variables. Note: b=Logistic regression coefficient; N = 378 *p < .05; **p < .001
finding is likely due to the fact that urban offenders are more likely to have a higher 
social status and better employment opportunities compared to rural migrant offenders. 
Therefore, the findings likely indicate a difference in opportunity structures between rural
and urban offenders.
Question 4: Based on the current study, are rural migrants more likely to receive a 
harsher sentence?
In the China Judicial Online dataset, rural migrants are disproportionally 
represented as criminal defendants in Guangdong province in 2015. One possible 
explanation is that rural migrants have committed more crimes than urban offenders. An 
alternative explanation is that rural migrants in Guangdong province may have 
experienced certain types of enforcement bias in the justice system. In order to examine 
these propositions, the researcher decided to examine whether rural migrants were more 
likely to receive a harsher sentence compared to urban offenders. The idea here is that 
differential sentencing might indicate bias in the justice system.








Table 7: Sentence in Months by Urban 
and Rural Offenders
Firstly, the researcher decided to examine whether there is a significant difference 
for fixed term sentences between rural and urban offenders. Table 7 introduces 
descriptive statistics on those who were sentenced to a fixed term sentence, regardless of 
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offense. There were no obvious outliers within either rural or urban offender groups. The 
minimum and maximum fixed term sentences between rural and urban offenders do not 
appear to differ too drastically, yet it does seem that rural migrants received longer 
sentences. Based on Table 7, rural migrants receive, on average, longer sentences (M = 
119.66) than urban offenders (M = 99.34).
Since aggravated assault is the only type of offense that has a relatively large 
number of cases for both rural and urban offenders, the researcher utilized an independent
sample t-test to compare average months of a sentence for both rural and urban offenders 
who committed aggravated assault. There was a significant difference in scores for rural 
(M = 157.75, SD = 37.331) and urban (M = 137.44, SD = 41.570; t(68) = -2.098, p = .040,
two-tailed) subsamples. The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean difference 
= 20.3, 95% CI: .-39.638 to -.985) was of moderate effect size (eta squared = .0625). The 
results show that for aggravated assault, there is a statistically significant difference in 
fixed-term imprisonment between rural and urban offenders. On average, rural migrants 
have been incarcerated approximately 20 months more than urban offenders for 
aggravated assault offenses.
Secondly, the researcher examined whether there is a significant difference for life
sentences and sentences to death between rural and urban offenders. Table 8 provides 
information on the imposition of life sentences and the death penalty for rural and urban 
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Sentence Types (Life sentence/Death) Urban Rural Total
N % N % N
Life 9 18 41 82 50
Death 14 40 21 60 35
Total 23 27 62 73 85
Table 8: Sentence in Life and Death Penalty
offenders. As previously discussed, approximately 60% of the people in the sample are 
rural migrants while the remaining 40% are urban offenders. Here it can be seen that rural
offenders who were sentenced to life in prison are disproportionate high (82%) in their 
representation in the current sample. Conversely, the percentage of rural migrant 
offenders who were sentenced to death is proportionate to their sample representation, 
with 60% of rural migrants receiving the death penalty.
It is worth nothing that many types of crimes, such as rape, sex trafficking, 
occupational crime, interrupting law enforcement, and copyright infringement, have 
numbers too small for statistical interpretation. Tables 9 and 10 are included to 
demonstrate sentencing differences between urban and rural offenders, when controlling 
for type of offense, which exclude offenses have very low numbers. As can be seen in 
Table 9, rural migrants are more likely to receive a longer sentence for aggravated 
assault, robbery, and drug dealing compared to urban offenders.
Urban Rural
N Average Months N Average In Months
Homicide/Manslaughter 1 180.00 15 183.47
Aggravated Assault 27 137.44 41 157.76
Robbery 17 113.65 37 133.22
Occupational Crime 12 123.83 0 0.00
Drug Dealing 16 65.31 15 105.13
Fraud 11 52.55 9 44.56
Theft 13 37.69 31 37.10
Table 9: Sentence in Months by Crimes and Migrant Status
Table 10 provides information on life imprisonment and death penalties for 
selected crimes. It details whether a defendant will received a life sentence or the death 
penalty depending on their migrant status, when controlling types of offenses and 
excluding those who received fixed term sentences. Take homicide as an example; among
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urban offenders who have committed homicide, between a life sentence and the death 
penalty, approximately 38% of them were sentenced to life in prison, while 63% were 
sentenced to death. For rural offenders charged with homicide, however, between a life 
sentence and the death penalty, approximately 63% were sentenced to life and 37% were 
sentenced to death. For homicide, then, urban offenders were more likely to receive the 
death penalty than rural migrants when excluding those from either category who 
received a fixed term sentence. Similarly, with respect to aggravated assault, between a 
life sentence and the death penalty, urban offenders received a higher proportion of death 
sentences compared to migrant offenders (55.5 to 35.3). Once again, these results only 
indicate the likelihood of an offender receiving a life sentence or death penalty for the 
same type of offense when considering their migrant status.
Urban Rural
Life % Death % Life % Death %
Homicide/Manslaughter 3 37.5 5 62.5 12 63.2 7 36.8
Aggravated Assault 4 44.4 5 55.5 11 64.7 6 35.3
Rape 1 100 0 0 2 100 0 0
Sex Trafficking 0 0 0 0 2 50 2 50
Robbery 0 0 0 0 5 62.5 3 37.5
Occupational Crime 1 33.3 2 66.7 1 100 0 0
Drug Dealing 0 0 2 100 7 87.5 1 12.5
Endanger Public Safety 0 0 0 0 1 50 1 50
Table 10: Life Sentence by Migrant Status for Selected Crimes
In the current sample, these findings, with regard to life sentences and sentences 
to death, do not clearly indicate a consistent bias based on the migration status of the 
offender. However, it should be noted that the total number of people who received either 
of these two types of sentences is relatively small, therefore, any differences based on our
observations may merely be due to chance. In conclusion, the current study shows that 
there is a significant difference in fixed-term sentence between rural migrants and urban 
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offenders when able to control for offense type. However, there is no significant 
association between migrant status and the likelihood of receiving a life sentence or death
penalty.
So far, it seems that rural migrants received on average longer fixed term 
sentences. However, it should not yet be drawn as a conclusion that migrant status is the 
sole factor in determining who is likely to receive a longer sentence. The criminological 
literature on felony sentences suggests that severity of the offense, prior criminal history, 
aggravating circumstances of an offense, and the consequences of an offense all play 
significant roles in determining the severity of the sentence (Blumstein et al., 1983; Lu 
and Kelly, 2008). Although a primary research interest of the author is whether rural 
migrants are likely to receive a harsher sentence when controlling for type of crime, rural 
migrants and urban offenders differ in gender, age, occupation, education, and victim-
offender relationship. Therefore, it is important to examine how migrant status, along 
with other variables, may affect sentence difference, when controlling for type of offense.
One challenge for the researcher is that there are no readily available sentencing 
guidelines in China that specify breakpoints in the sentencing structure distinguishing less
severe from more severe sentences. As a result, the researcher divided all types of 
sentences for aggravated assault into 3-quartile divisions, and created 3 new categorical 
variables; the lenient sentence quartile (lowest 25% of sentences for offenders charged 
with aggravated assault versus all others), the medium range sentence quartile (division 
of sentences at the median point for aggravated assault), and the harsh sentence quartile 
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(most severe 25% of sentences for offenders charged with aggravated assault versus all 
others), as Table 11 indicates.
The variable “sentence” was originally coded as an ordinal level variable 
beginning with the shortest fixed term sentences in months, moving toward maximum 
sentences, including life imprisonment and the death penalty. A logistic regression model 
was utilized to examine what factors might impact sentencing severity when controlling 
for type of crime. Three binary logistic regression models were run, one model using 
each of the new quartile variables. For each regression, the dependent variable “sentence”
was recoded into a dichotomous variable. For the lenient sentence quartile, the “sentence”
variable was recoded into “less than 132 months” = 0, and “132 months or more” = 1. For
the medium sentence quartile, the “sentence” variable was recoded into “less than 168 
months” = 0, and “168 months or more” = 1. Lastly, the harsh sentence quartile was 
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132 4 22 (Lenient Sentence Quartile)
144 10 32
156 6 38





Life Sentence 15 83 (Harsh Sentence Quartile)
Death 11 94
Total 94 94
Table 11: Sentencing Severity Division by Three Sentence Quartiles
recoded into a new variable with “fixed term sentence” = 0, and “life sentence or death 
penalty” = 1. Migrant status, offender’s state of mind (anger-triggered/non-anger 
triggered); education background of the defendant (less than high school/more than high 
school); occupation of the defendants (unemployed/ employed); defendant known to 
victim; co-defendants; prior conviction; age of the defendant; gender; and, ethnicity of 
the defendant are the independent variables. The researcher aims to utilize the new 
sentencing variable to examine if rural migrant status matters in terms of the severity of 
the criminal punishment, when controlling for a variety of variables including type of 
offense.
After examining these three binary regression models, the “migrant status” 
variable was significant (p < .001 with odds ratio of 2.758, see Table 12) only when the 
medium sentence (below 168 months or above) is the dependent variable. In other words,
migrant status was only statistically significant when examining sentences that fall either 
below or above the median. This finding indicates that when an offender is a rural 
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Independent Variables b Odds ratio
Migrant Status 1.015 2.758 **
Ethnicity -0.314 0.731
State of Mind (Anger/Other than Anger) -0.007 0.993
Gender 0.009 1.009
Age -0.005 0.995
Education (Below High School/At or Above High school) 0.219 1.245
Employment (Unemployed/Employed) -0.093 0.911
Victim-Offender Relationship (Knwon/Unknown to Victim) 0.895 2.448 **
Co-Defendant -0.395 0.674 *
Prior Conviction -0.513 0.599
Constant -0.750 0.472
Table 12: Logistic Regression of Variables on Medium Sentence Quartile. Note:
b=Logistic regression coefficient; N = 94 *p < .050 **p < .001
migrant, the likelihood that he or she will receive a sentence longer than the median of 
168 months is approximately 3 times that of an urban offender.
The current findings indicate that compared to urban offenders, rural migrants 
were more likely to receive sentences above the median range of 168 months for 
aggravated assault offenses. None of the other variables pertaining to the offender or 
offense characteristics influenced whether an offender received a harsher sentence in 
aggravated assault cases. These findings indicate that for the same type of offense, rural 





The current research aimed to explore the post-reform era of China—a country 
whose history makes it an excellent case study for examining the relationship between 
rural migration and crime. As a research piece that is exploratory in nature (but 
theoretically driven) the author aims to offer some theoretical insights that are 
comprehensive, but not exhaustive, on the characteristics of rural migrant offenders in 
Guangdong Province.
As noted in the current study, rural migrants are disproportionately represented in 
the Online Judicial Dataset in Guangdong Province. Most of these rural defendants were 
undereducated and underemployed. They were more likely arrested because of crimes 
against the person, such as aggravated assault, robbery, homicide, and sex trafficking; 
crimes that are traditionally referred to in the criminological literature as “street crimes”. 
However, urban (native) offenders committed nearly all occupational crime, such as 
corruption. In addition, compared to urban defendants, rural defendants appeared to 
receive longer fixed-term sentences, when controlling for the same type of offense. These
findings indicate possible correlations between socioeconomic disadvantages that rural 
migrants have experienced in Guangdong Province. They also provide important 
information on how Chinese criminal justice officials, urban policies, public opinions 
(towards crime and punishment), and social discrimination towards rural migrants, 
directly or indirectly, may have influenced the criminal behavior and dispositions of rural 
migrant offenders in China.
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Crime Type and Differential Opportunity Theory
As previously noted, rural migrants in Guangdong Province were more likely to 
have been arrested and convicted of “street crimes”. These findings are consistent with 
differential opportunity theory. Differential opportunity theory proposes that individuals 
from a lower social class confront several barriers to access both legitimate and 
illegitimate opportunities. For instance, if an individual is not eligible to become a 
governmental official (i.e. because they are a rural migrant), it would be impossible for 
them to commit related crimes, such as those involving governmental corruption.
The authors of differential opportunity theory (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) originally
stated that lower class adolescents are most likely to be deprived of legitimate 
(educational and occupational) opportunities for success, placing them at greater risk of 
experiencing frustration and anger. Therefore, engagement in a delinquent subculture 
may develop in the absence of legitimate opportunities. Delinquent subcultures emerge 
from socially disorganized communities that cannot provide sufficient legitimate 
opportunities for success and are unable to control the youths’ behavior. For the youths 
involved in this subculture, violence is used as an alternative way to gain peer 
recognition, as well as deal with their anger and frustration.
Although Cloward and Ohlin primarily focused on the deviant behaviors of 
juveniles, the relevance of their research to the current study is still significant. Note that 
differential opportunity theory maintains that access to the illegitimate opportunity 
structure is also limited. The type of illegal activities available to someone experiencing 
frustration is dependent upon the structure and opportunities provided by their immediate 
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environment, such as their occupation. As much of the literature confirms, rural migrants 
have experienced various socioeconomic barriers and psychological stressors in Chinese 
society that are very similar to what juvenile offenders experienced in Cloward and 
Ohlin’s study. Their experiences associated with financial frustration and psychological 
turmoil might create an antagonistic attitude toward society in general. When legitimate 
means become largely inaccessible to disadvantaged groups, the chances of developing 
illegitimate ways of survival are relatively high. In our current study, rural migrants are 
more likely to be underemployed or work at low-paid positions at the time of their 
offense. As Cloward and Ohlin’s work would predict, rural migrants are also more likely 
to commit common “street crimes”.
In contrast, urban (native) offenders appeared to have more opportunities for 
organized and white collar crimes. For instance, crimes such as copyright violation, 
corruption, and running an illegal business are committed by urban (native) offenders, 
and indicates their higher social status when compared to rural migrant offenders. 
Differential opportunity theory might explain that opportunities for corruption are only 
readily available to urban offenders and not to rural migrants. In other words, not only 
does legitimate access to monetary success have socio-economic foundations, but access 
to illegitimate opportunities do as well.
Limitations still exist in the current hypothesis. Although, a large number of rural 
migrants were found to have committed “street crimes” in the current study, it cannot be 
concluded that rural migrants only commit “street crime”. Future research should collect 
a much broader sample from all levels of court in Guangdong Province and determine 
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whether this assumption still stands. Self-report research might also allow us to examine 
differential opportunity theory’s application to rural migrant populations in China.
Concentrated Socioeconomic Disadvantage in Rural Migrant Communities
Another important observation, along with our discussion of social changes in 
China, is how urban social environments impact individual behavior. Since the 1990s, the
priorities of urban spaces in China focused on economic growth and production. As 
China underwent extremely fast economic development since the introduction of the 
“Open-Market” policy, China has prioritized the industrial use of its territory (Cartier, 
2001). This over-emphasis on industrialization brought with, many of the problems that 
have traditionally accompanied rapid urbanization. In particular, there was an 
unintentional creation of overcrowded urban enclaves where rural migrant populations 
were concentrated in low-quality housing in mega-cities. Research has shown that the 
distribution of resources and opportunities in China has not been equally enjoyed by all 
social groups (Cartier, 2001). Moreover, the unequal distribution of resources and 
opportunities can be geographically observed. Urban residents were more able to afford 
the price of real estate and had access to more preferred neighborhoods. In contrast, rural 
migrants’ enclaves were typically identified as poor, as well as socially and economically 
segregated from urban residents’ neighborhoods. These enclaves where rural migrants 
ended up were either company prearranged dormitory complexes or neighborhoods with 
housing that workers of low socioeconomic status could afford. For migrant workers, 
these compounds often provided the only viable place to live (Wong et al., 2008). 
Importantly, these locations have highly transient populations.
129
Another thing that should be noted here is that rural migrant, who have not been 
provided housing by their employers or cannot afford to rent a place in the city are 
generally forced to stay in villages located on the outskirts of the city, which are normally
referred to as a “migrant village”. Even though the vast majority of these villages are not 
walled or gated, their temporary, unorganized, and underdeveloped form distinguish them
from their city surroundings; this separates rural migrants from urban residents and 
further hinders their social integration. Rural migrants have, for a long period of time, 
been segregated from city society. It is important to know that this segregation was not 
only because of the high cost of housing in urban China (that rural migrant workers 
cannot afford), but also because the household registration policies hinder their full entry 
into urban life.
As seen throughout the study, there is a relationship between the massive rural 
migration and the continuing increase of crime in the cities. In urban areas, factors such 
as community disorganization, low socioeconomic status of the residents, and the lack of 
informal social controls in neighborhoods may facilitate crime and victimization. These 
empirical observations are consistent with criminological literature that focuses on the 
relationship between immigration and concentrated disadvantages—a cluster of problems
including poverty, high child mortality rates, single mother households, and crime—
within certain neighborhoods (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). These theories were heavily 
influenced by Shaw & McKay‘s (1942) work on social disorganization, and consider 
factors including both neighborhood characteristics and informal social controls as they 
relate to juvenile delinquency and crime (Sampson, 2012).
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Social disorganization is defined as “the inability of a community to realize the 
common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls” (Bursik 1988; 
Kornhauser 1978). The theory holds that these social controls will be more effective in 
neighborhoods with greater residential stability, and more ethnic and normative 
homogeneity (Steenbeek & Hipp, 2011). In contrast, social disorder and crime are more 
likely to occur in the central zones of cities which are characterized by high levels of 
residential mobility and weak social controls. These conditions are more common where 
housing is cheap and physically deteriorating; such locations attract the most 
economically disadvantaged populations who, for a variety of reasons, are the most 
highly mobile.
However, as was seen in the literature, rural migrants in China are often culturally
and economically marginalized from city life (Wong et al., 2010; Akay et al., 2012). 
Moreover, while they are not necessarily members of any ethnic-racial minority, their 
social status is closely associated with their “hukou” status and they are treated as a 
“race-like” social group.
Since its introduction, social disorganization theory has been reworked into the 
theory of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is a combination of shared expectations 
within a community and a willingness to exercise responsibilities for the well-being of 
the community. This theoretical construct has been elaborated in systemic terms, that is, 
the local community is viewed as a complex system of friendship, kinship and 
acquaintanceship networks, as well as associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing 
social processes (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). It is these 
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ongoing social and cultural relations and mutual expectations that constitute the 
community, and act as controls on the behavior of the community‘s members. Of course, 
consistent with social disorganization theory, these networks cannot exist where 
residential mobility is high.
Sampson has shown the utility of collective efficacy to explain the willingness of 
community members to act upon their common problems for their mutual well-being and 
to reduce violence and delinquency (Sampson, 1997). Other empirical studies, such as 
Armstrong, Katz, and Schnebly (2010) found that neighborhoods with a higher level of 
informal social control and stronger social ties have lower rates of crime and delinquency
when controlling for the poverty level of each community. Browning and Cagney (2002) 
also found that neighborhoods that have a high level of collective efficacy report better 
self-rated physical health when individual-level demographic and health backgrounds are 
controlled.
Other than the theoretical and empirical discourse from the western 
criminological tradition, research from other post-Communist societies also sheds light 
on the relationship between migration and crime, as well as on how collective efficacy 
may reduce the effects of economic disadvantages within neighborhoods on crime. A 
Russian scholar, Elina Treyger (2013), examined the relationship between migration and 
violent crime from both the Stalinist and Post-Stalinist eras. Her study showed that 
migration that was more heavily regulated by the state (i.e forced migration) had caused 
more social disorders and crimes than migration with lesser constraints by the state (i.e. 
voluntary migration) (Treyger, 2013). As Treyer concluded, migration was likely to 
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destroy social networks both in the rural areas and in the receiving cities, which resulted 
in diminished social capacity for informal social control. However, for those migrant 
communities with well-established social networks, the violent crime rates were very low
to none compared to communities without these social networks. This finding is 
particularly insightful for the current research as both countries were communist for 
much of the twentieth century.
Social disorganization and collective efficacy provide important theoretical 
insights and policy implications for the current study. Due to limitations of the current 
study, the level of disorganization of neighborhoods where rural migrants resided cannot 
be directly measured. Systematically examination of whether the rural migrants who 
appear in the current study were more likely to reside in disorganized communities 
compared to their rural and urban counterparts who are not offenders in the current study 
was not possible. However, consistent with social disorganization theory, what the current
study does show is that the rural migrants who appear in the Online Judicial Database 
have socioeconomic disadvantages that they bring to their lives in Guangdong. In the 
current study, rural migrant offenders are underemployed and undereducated. It must also
be recognized that “migrant villages” exist in Guangdong Province. It is highly possible 
that some or many of the rural migrants in the current study have lived in neighborhoods 
that would be characterized as disorganized and lacking collective efficacy.
With regard to the case of China specifically, this hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between social disorganization and/or collective efficacy and crime does 
have some empirical support. According to Wu et al. (2007), as introduced in Chapter II, 
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the “hukou” system of household registration categorizes people as rural or urban 
workers; rural migrants are excluded from such urban amenities as schooling and health 
care. Migrants cluster in neighborhoods where rents are low, including urban villages, 
neighborhoods built prior to 1949, factory compounds, and privatized work-units. These 
living spaces, however, are typically associated with high residential turnover rates and 
concentrated poverty. Strycker et al. (2008) conducted research focused on how rural 
workers perceive the collective efficacy and overall neighborhood environment where 
they work. Their findings suggest that rural workers residing in close-knit neighborhoods 
tended to have more positive views than those who resided elsewhere. While some rural 
workers did live in cohesive communities, those rural migrants who worked in less well-
paying jobs tended to rate their neighborhoods as less socially cohesive and more 
problematic than other workers. The creation of urban enclaves further isolated rural 
migrant from the rest of society.
Social Change, Anomie and Crime
Setting aside, for the moment, the fact that rural migrants and urban residents 
were likely to experience differential opportunity structures that makes it more difficult 
for rural migrants to achieve their social and economic goals through legitimate means, it 
is worth noting that Guangdong Province is one of the most vibrant in China–it has one 
of the fastest growing GDPs and one of the largest migrant populations in China. The 
overall crime rate in Guangdong province has increased drastically over the years (Wong,
2009). Specifically, there is an association between fast economic growth and increased 
crime rates. This observation is consistent with Durkheim’s Anomie theory, as it 
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thematically proposes that drastic social changes could be the cause of a state of 
normlessness, precipitating crime and deviance. While Durkheim’s work was concerned 
with the societal level, the theoretical use of the concept of anomie has occurred at the 
individual level. According to Robert Merton, who adapted Durkheim’s concept of 
anomie, the greater the difficulties in achieving economic success, the greater the degree 
of individual level “strain”. This strain leads to the increased likelihood that an individual
will commit a crime. In the following section, an overarching theoretical framework for 
understanding the current study’s findings will be presented. First,the author will 
introduce the original Anomie theory by Emile Durkheim. Following this, a revised 
version of Anomie Theory by Robert Merton will be discussed. Finally, Robert Agnew’s 
general strain theory will be presented. All of these theories are complementary to each 
other and provide an overall picture of how social changes and individual level strains 
may affect the fluctuation of crime rates, and who commits crime.
Anomie Theory is unique among explanations of crime and deviance because it is 
composed of two related, although not identical, levels of analysis for norm-violating 
behavior. It focused at macro-level structural and micro-level individual sources of 
anomie which provide motivation for crime and deviance.
The classic Anomie Theory that was created by Emile Durkheim (1897) begins 
with the idea that healthy societies function best when they effectively control the 
behavior of their members. However, an extreme sense of normlessness should be 
expected during a fast social and economic transition, when a society is less capable of 
exerting behavioral and moral regulation on its citizens. From Durkheim’s perspective, 
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anomie is defined by the existence of social conditions that disrupt society’s ability to 
regulate the behavior of its members effectively. In his Anomie theory, crime was not his 
primary concern. Durkheim believed that a certain amount of crime in a society is normal
and healthy, having the capacity to provide positive functions for society and its 
members. His greater interest focused on understanding what societal changes would 
make anomie or normlessness develop, and its impact upon people’s behavior. In The 
Division of Labor in Society (1893) and Suicide ([1897]1951), Durkheim established the 
foundation for a sociologically based theory of anomie. He envisioned anomie as a macro
level problem tied to fluctuations in a society’s division of labor and their overall 
development. He maintains that external societal controls, such as the enforcement of 
laws, are necessary for regulating individual behavior, which ensures that each person is 
in harmony with his or her condition, and desires only what that person may legitimately 
hope for as the normal reward for his or her activity.
Durkheim stated that anomie develops when societal controls over individual 
behavior become ineffective, causing a breakdown in moral guidance. People’s goals, 
wants, and desires become unregulated, and in this condition of deregulation the 
incidence of crime and deviance may increase. While Durkheim suggested that there are 
various ways that social changes can lead to a state of anomie, what is important for our 
purposes is that Durkheim recognized the role that industrialization and urbanization 
might play. As Lewis Coser (1984) explains in his introduction to The Division of Labor 
in Society, Durkheim is asking, “[w]hat were the consequences of a complex and 
advanced system of the division of labor on the cohesion and solidarity of societies?” 
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Similar to the European Industrial Revolution during which Durkheim was working, 
China has gone through accelerated economic change in the past three decades. Different 
in pace from the Industrial Revolution, however, China’s economic reform has had an 
unprecedented developmental speed that surpassed that experienced by the European 
countries during the 18th and 19th centuries. If China is undergoing a state of anomie 
during this period of social and economic change, coupled with the lack of sufficient and 
timely formal social control mechanisms, crimes rate should be expected to increase, 
which has been widely confirmed by the literature (Bakken, 2000; Dai et al., 2013; Lu & 
Messner, 2001; Xu, 2009). However, Durkheim did not explain how social fluctuations or
anomie differentially influence individual behaviors in a more specific manner. For 
instance, why are some people more likely to commit crime than others? In particular, 
with respect to the current study, why are rural migrants overrepresented in the Online 
Judicial Dataset? Robert Merton (1938) also employed the concept of anomie by 
developing a theory designed to show how some social forces exert a differential pressure
upon persons in the society to engage in nonconformist conduct.
Merton’s theory of anomie focuses upon the culturally defined goal of American 
society and the means used to attain it. He identified financial success as the primary goal
embraced by American culture, and it was expected that all members of society would try
to attain this goal. Simultaneously, according to Merton, society defined the legitimate 
means people can use for attempting to achieve financial success. These avenues for 
success are said to be institutionalized as they are socially defined and enforced, even 
though not everyone has equal access to these legitimate means. Thus, Merton describes 
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anomie as a structural condition brought about by a disjunction between the culturally 
defined goal of American society and the legitimate means for attaining it, which may 
lead to crime and deviance. While Merton was concerned in his work with American 
society, his theory provides insight for our current study. As China has moved from a 
collective orientation to a more market-driven and self-interested society, economic 
achievement has become one of the leading measures of success. Most importantly, 
Merton described situations in which people were denied access to the legitimate means 
to achieve wealth (e.g. limited education, insufficient resources, lack of social influence 
networks, discrimination). With relation to our current study, it must be acknowledged 
that rural migrants have typically experienced economic hardship after migrating (e.g. 
unemployed or working in unstable, low wage jobs) and these inequalities and 
marginalized social experiences represent well what Merton would call a denial of access 
to legitimate means.
In order to bridge the macro-level anomie to micro-level anomie, Merton defined 
five possible “modes of adaptation” to the experience of anomie based on a person’s 
orientation toward society’s means and goals. Innovation is the mode of adaptation that 
closely pertains to this study and is the most significant contributor to the current 
findings. According to Merton, innovation is a prevalent deviant adaptation and produces 
the majority of criminal behavior. Individuals who innovate continue to accept the 
legitimacy of the cultural goal of wealth acquisition, but reject the approved means for 
achieving that goal. In essence, they attempt to achieve financial success through 
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alternative, often illegal, avenues such as theft and robbery. This mode of adaptation 
might explain the relation seen between rural migration and crime in Guangdong.
In the early 1990s, a popular Chinese slogan was “to get rich is glorious” (Deng &
Cordilia, 1999). Deng in a 1992 speech in the Pearl Delta Region, famously said, 
“Increased gross domestic product and household income nationwide are the ultimate 
goals to improve quality of life. We have to let a small number of people get rich first, 
and then everyone is getting rich.” Unfortunately, Deng’s vision did not turn into reality. 
Although the pursuit of economic success became extremely prominent, the actual 
achievement of wealth was limited to only certain groups of people because of their 
social status, educational background, and occupational opportunities. For a long time, 
rural migrants have been left behind in the progress toward financial success. As shown 
in our current study, rural migrants are often at a disadvantage in terms of education and 
had no steady employment at the time of the offense. As seen in Chapter III, financial 
success is vitally important to rural migrants and is the single largest motivation for their 
move to urban locations. It can be safely assumed that this is true of Guangdong’s rural 
migrants as well. Unfortunately, Guangdong’s rural migrants, like most in China, are 
socially and economically disadvantaged. Faced with a lack of legitimate opportunities to
acquire the wealth they desire, Merton would not be surprised that Guangdong’s rural 
migrants turn to crime at higher rates than their more well off urban counterparts.
In conclusion, based on Anomie and Strain theories, anomie is the cause of the 
norm-violating behavior. At the societal level, anomie theories focus upon structural 
breakdowns, a state of deregulation creating pressure for certain categories of people to 
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engage in deviance to achieve satisfaction. Thus macro level theories deal with the way 
particular groups of people deal with the introduction of societal pressures. This macro-
level Anomie theory is well manifested in the current study. As noted in Chapter III, in 
general, rural migrants in China have experienced and are continually experiencing 
social, economic and cultural barriers. In this sample, rural migrants have also 
demonstrated multi-faceted disadvantages at both the social and economic level. For 
instance, characteristics of the rural migrant offenders can be summarized as three ‘lows’:
low education, low employment rate, and low social status. Crimes that these rural 
migrants committed are those typically considered “street crimes”. If macro-level Anomie
theory is applied to the current findings, it may be concluded that there exists a structural 
level anomie that exerts extra pressures for rural migrants during their post-transitory 
period. If legal opportunities cannot be provided, criminal behaviors should be expected 
as potential alternative means for these people to survive.
At the individual level, Anomie theory identified the strains that individuals 
experience or perceive, thereby creating the pressures which motivate them to engage in 
acts of crime and deviance. Consistent with this micro perspectives of anomie and strain 
theories, in the current study, rural migrants have very low education, are underemployed,
or worked only as day laborers. The majority of crimes that rural migrants committed 
were offenses of violent and property-driven nature. It is not difficult to imagine these 
individuals, who are residing in one of the biggest migrants-receiving city, find it difficult
just trying to survive, let alone, thrive. When the disjunction between aspiration and 
achievement, as Merton discussed, is such that there are nearly no other opportunities to 
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achieve a better life, crime may become the only viable solution. However, one caveat for
the current study is that there is an inability to measure whether strain is the primary 
reason why rural migrants have committed crimes. There is no variable in the current 
dataset reflecting the level of strain each individual experienced. Future research should 
design surveys to examine whether rural migrants in Guangdong Province who 
committed criminal offenses are more likely to experience strain.
Conflict Theories and Biases within the Criminal Justice System
As seen when discussing the relationship between crime and the socioeconomic 
disadvantages that rural migrants tend to experience, the current study indicated that rural
migrants were disproportionately represented as criminal defendants in the Guangdong 
Province. When the sample is divided at the median point for fixed term sentences, rural 
migrants received longer sentences for aggravated assault than urban (native) offenders. 
It is possible that rural migrants, rather than committing more crime, might simply be 
experiencing biased treatment within the Chinese justice system. This hypothesis is 
somewhat supported by the scholarly literature and news media accounts discussed in 
Chapter II. In order to clarify this hypothesis, the author will discuss group conflict 
theory and culture conflict theory.
Conflict theories primarily focus on the way in which the law serves the interests 
of those persons or groups who are powerful enough to control the creation and 
enforcement of the law. George Vold (1958) and Willem Bonger (1969) produced two of 
the earliest group conflict theories in the criminological literature. As stated by George 
Vold, “the whole political process of law making, law breaking, and law enforcing 
141
becomes a direct reflection of deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between interests 
groups and their general struggles for the control of police power of the state” (1958, p. 
205). Those who could produce legislative majorities won control over police power and 
could dominate the policies that decide whose behavior will be defined as a violation of 
the law. Willem Bonger (1969) saw crime as the product of capitalism, which promotes 
egoistic competition among and within classes while denying to the lower class 
opportunities to achieve socioeconomic success by legal means (e.g., social structure and 
anomie). Bonger hypothesized that crime is produced by the “capitalistic organization of 
society”. All classes are affected by the egoism and greed created by capitalism, but since
the bourgeoisie controls the law, it is the egoistic actions of the proletariat that are defined
as criminal. The cause of crime in all classes, therefore, is the capitalist mode of 
economic organization. But, those who control the means of production will have the 
final say on the law. As for the theoretical relevance of Bonger’s work to China, he would
expect that as Chinese society moved from “socialism” toward a market society, crimes 
committed by lower social classes should be expected to occur as classes are created and 
citizens begin to adopt the egoistic mindset cultivated by capitalism.
The idea of “social threat” plays a significant role in conflict theory regarding the 
formation of law and the operation of the criminal justice system. According to the 
conflict perspective, the greater the perceived threat represented by members of minority 
groups, the poor and rural citizens, the greater will be the emphasis on controlling these 
populations using the criminal law. In fact, a question likely to be posed by a conflict 
theorist is, “to what extent is the widespread fear of the ‘dangerous classes’ created and 
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fueled by the powerful?” At any rate, the perceived threat posed by the powerless may 
result in institutional and systemic changes regarding more restrictive laws and criminal 
justice system processes. Conflict theorists also contend that the political threat presented 
by the underclasses also affects the discretionary decision making of individual criminal 
justice officials–from arrest decisions of police officers to harsher sentences imposed by 
judges.
Relating to the current study, “hukou” was designed to function as both a political 
and economic control mechanism. People who have a rural hukou have been prevented 
from receiving many of the same social benefits that urban hukou holders enjoyed. These 
barriers and exclusions reinforce the urban-rural social class divide. Those with a rural 
hukou are routinely marginalized by political, economic, and cultural forces that identify 
and process them as inferior and criminal. As the Chinese Academy of Social Science 
reported in 2015, the high rate of urban crime associated with a new generation of rural 
migrants may be a result of their experiences in marginalization, the limited access they 
have received to occupational and educational opportunities, and the disparity in income 
between rural and urban residents, etc. Regarding economic and civil rights, rural 
migrants tend to have little or no social protection and access to welfare benefits, and are,
thus, more likely to experience cultural and psychological maladaptation during the post-
migratory stage (Hu, 2012). Rural migrants, especially those who have stayed in cities for
a relatively short period of time (while without stable jobs and local connections) are 
highly likely to be seen as a threat to social stability and safety. As seen in Chapter II, that
perceived threat can result in the mistreatment of rural migrants by the Chinese police. In 
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the current study, most of the rural migrant offenders had no job at the time of arrest and 
have a very low-level of education. It is possible that this group of rural migrants is 
subjected to more arrests and charges, not because they committed any more criminal 
offenses, but because they are more likely to be watched and therefore arrested.
Beyond group conflict theories, cultural conflict theory focuses on clashes that 
occur between social groups over social values, interest, and norms. Thorsten Sellin 
(1938) argued that cultural conflict is a disagreement over cultural norms. In his classic 
analysis of the relationship between immigration and crime, Sellin argued that crime is 
the product of culture conflict between groups with different “conduct norms”, in which 
normative behavior of the less powerful groups is defined as “criminal”. As cultures 
become more complex within a given society (e.g. when members of rural groups migrate
to urban areas), it is likely that these migrant groups may come into opposition with 
urban group cultural norms. In conclusion, according to both group conflict and culture 
conflict theorists, crimes are nothing but either direct or indirect results of ideological 
clashes between people belonging to different social groups (categorized by political, 
ethnic, or religious differences). Thus, according to the conflict perspective, the reason 
that rural migrant offenders are disproportionately represented in the current study is 
because they are marginalized by political, economic, and cultural forces that result in 
their inferior social status in China. However, whether conflict theories have policy 
relevance is at issue only if it can be empirically measured against the proposed theories. 
Future studies should measure this assumption based on an in-depth analysis of legal 
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procedure and opinions from key personnel involved in the criminal justice policy and 
decision-making process.
Of course, other than socioeconomic disadvantages and strains, discrimination 
from the criminal justice system in China, there is a third interpretation of the over-
representation of rural migrants in the Intermediate Level Courts in Guangdong Province.
That is, socioeconomic disadvantages and individual level strains that rural migrants 
experience, as well as bias from the Chinese criminal justice system, together affect the 
disproportionate representation of rural migrants in the current study. Both literature and 
the current research confirm that rural migrants disproportionate representation in the 
criminal defendant population in Guangdong Province, as well as the types of offenses 
they have committed, directly relate to their disadvantaged social status. Moreover, urban
citizens, law enforcement officers, and the judicial system are all sources of 
discrimination and marginalization that rural migrants experience in urban China. 
Comparatively speaking, rural migrants in China have confronted, and are continuing to 
face, the same types of challenges as African-Americans in the United States. Much of 
their experience with the criminal justice system is largely influenced by their 
employment and educational background, in addition to socioeconomic barriers they face
every day. The goal of the current study is to help bring to light to the criminal justice 
experiences of rural migrants in China, and to raise public awareness, to help rural 
migrants to better adapt to their urban life by providing equal opportunities for 
employment, education, health care, and social recognition.
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